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ABSTRACT

Management of capital structure is an important part of maximizing the firm
value.

Financial research has proposed many theories that explain aspects of firm

behavior when a firm makes financial decisions that change the firm's capital structure.
However, none of the theories fully explain why firms with similar fundamental
characteristics make different financing choices.
This study focuses on what motivates managers when they are making external
financing decisions.

It investigated whether the motivation for the decisions about

capital structure are driven by market timing or managerial overoptimism. This is done
by focusing on equity and debt issues and whether these issues bring the firms closer to
or farther away from their optimal capital structure.
This study finds that the excess leverage proxy is negatively and significantly
related to the one, two, and three year post-financing buy-and-hold abnormal returns
even when firm characteristics are controlled. These results are also found when nonissuing matched firms, small firms, and large firms are analyzed. These results are
consistent with the Managerial Overoptimism Theory.
The results of this study also show that in the first post-financing year firms that
issue equity when they are predicted to issue debt significantly out-perform

iv
firms that issue equity when they are predicted to issue equity. In addition, firms that
issue debt when they are predicted to issue equity perform significantly worse than
firms that issue debt and are predicted to issue debt.

This holds when firms are

matched by size, prior return, and book-to-market and when they are matched by
industry, market value of equity, and book-to-market.

These results support the

Managerial Overoptimism Theory.
In addition, this study shows that the difference in return for firms that are
predicted to increase leverage is significantly different than the firms that are predicted
to decrease leverage even when controlling for market, size, book-to-market, and
momentum factors. The difference in performance is statistically significant at the 1%
level for at least three years after external financing is issued.
This study examines press releases mentioning manager optimism or caution
(Malmendier and Tate 2008, 24) as a proxy for managerial overoptimism. The results
show that the excess leverage proxy and the press proxy for managerial overoptimism
are related with a positive correlation. These findings suggest a relationship between
the excess leverage proxy and the press proxy for overoptimism and support the validity
of the excess leverage proxy as a measure of managerial overoptimism.
This study evaluates what influences manager when they are making decisions
about issuing external financing.

This question is analyzed using many different

evaluation criteria. Overall, the results are opposite to the predictions of the Market
Timing Theory and consistent with the Managerial Overoptimism Theory. This suggests
that manager's optimism influences their decisions related to external financing.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

A prevailing question in corporate financial research is: When and why do firms
issue equity and debt?

None of the existing capital structure theories completely

explain firm behavior when a firm makes financial decisions that change the firm's
capital structure.

This study examines what motivates managers to issue external

equity and debt. Several methodologies are used to empirically test the Market Timing
Theory and the Managerial Overoptimism Theory to see if either of these theories can
explain firm behavior.

1.1 Importance of Examining Capital Structure
In order to maximize the market value of a firm, the capital structure must be
managed through correct investments and financial decisions. Capital structure is made
up of long-term debt, preference share capital, and share-holders funds the firm uses to
finance its operations. The capital structure of a firm is determined by the manager's
financing decisions. There are two components to the financing decision. The first part
is to decide how much financing a firm needs to raise. This amount is based on the
firm's investment decisions. The second part is to decide what mixture of debt and

1

2
equity is best for the firm. The mix of debt and equity will affect the risk and the value
of the firm (Ross, Westerfield, and Bradford 2008, 552; Khatik and Singh 2006,173).
The capital structure that is most beneficial to the stockholder is the one that
achieves the highest firm value. The initial capital structure of a firm at the time of the
IPO and each subsequent capital structure decision are significant managerial decisions.
There are many costs and benefits that managers consider as they decide how much
external financing they need and what form to issue. It is essential that the current and
future needs for capital be correctly estimated. If funds are inadequate or mismanaged,
the firm will suffer.

An incorrect decision can lead to financial distress or even

bankruptcy (Ross, Westerfield, and Bradford 2008, 553; Eriotis, Vasiliou, and VentouraNeokosmidi 2007, 321).

1.2 Motivations of the Study
There have been many theories proposed that describe the decisions that
managers make that affect the firm's capital structure. The two theories that have been
around the longest, have been studied the most, and have the most advocates are the
Tradeoff Theory and the Pecking Order Theory. The Tradeoff Theory focuses on an
optimal balance between tax shields, financial distress, and agency costs. The Pecking
Order Theory explains capital structure in terms of management choice of financing in
response to asymmetric information and transaction costs. These theories explain a
large part of the observed variation in capital structure but they do not explain all firm
behavior.
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Studies suggest that firms have a target capital structure as proposed by the
Tradeoff Theory (e.g. Hovakimian, Opier, and Titman 2001, 1; Titman and Tsyplakov
2006,1; Leary and Roberts 2005, 2575). However Hovakimian, Opier, and Titman (2001)
and Leary and Roberts (2005) also show that firms prefer internal funds to external
financing. Baker and Wurgler (2002) and Welch (2004) show evidence that firms do not
immediately react to changes in market value of equity and adjust their capital
structure. Leary and Roberts (2005), Kayhan and Titman (2007), Titman and Tsyplakov
(2006), and Fama and French (2002) all showed that firms are very slow to rebalance
their capital structure to its target debt level. These studies gave evidence that firms
take between two and ten years to make the adjustment.

In addition, Hovakimian

(2004) and Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2008) both found evidence that firm's capital
structure is persistent over long periods of time at a level that is not the optimal capital
structure. Finally, Fama and French (2002) found more profitable firms have less book
and market leverage when the tradeoff model predicts that more profitable firms have
more book leverage.
There have also been many studies that suggest that a firm's capital structure is
a product of its history based on a hierarchy of financing decisions as predicted by the
Pecking Order Theory of capital structure (e.g. Cai and Ghosh 2003, 20; Lemmon and
Zender 2008, 1; Frank and Goyal 2003, 217). However, Fama and French (2002) and
Frank and Goyal (2003) found that small, young, high-growth firms did not follow the
pecking order hierarchy but instead use equity because of the restricted amount of debt
available to them. In addition, Fama and French (2005) found that most firms issue or
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retire equity each year and that most of this activity is not done by firms under duress.
Byoun (2008) showed evidence that firms with high adjustment costs or financial
constraints are more likely to finance internally first than firms with low adjustment
costs or fewer financial constraints.

In addition, Byoun found that firms that were

above their target use all of their financial surpluses to pay off debt and firms that were
below their target were found to retire both debt and equity with their financial
surpluses.
The evidence found against the Tradeoff Theory and the Pecking Order Theory
has led to many other capital structure theories being proposed.

The Market Timing

Theory and Managerial Overoptimism Theory are two of these theories. The Market
Timing Theory proposes that managers time their equity issues to take advantage of
periods of high stock prices and investor overoptimism.

This theory predicts worse

performance following equity financing because the manager has timed the equity
offering to when the stock was overpriced. The Managerial Overoptimism Theory puts
forth the idea that managers that are overoptimisitic about their firm's ability to
generate positive net present value projects and believe that their equity is
undervalued, prefer to issue debt rather than equity.

This theory predicts worse

performance following debt financing. Overoptimistic managers avoid issuing equity
because they perceive their firms to be undervalued. Therefore firms with optimistic
managers are usually already over levered and issuing debt will move them farther away
from their optimal capital structure.
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The Market Timing Theory proposes that managers time equity issues so that
shares are issued at high prices and repurchased at low prices. This practice benefits
existing shareholders at the expense of new shareholders.

Several studies have

documented that firms experience significant stock price increases in the months
leading up to a SEO. These studies also documented low stock returns in the three to
five years following an IPO or a SEO (e.g., Ritter 1991, 3; Loughran and Ritter 1995, 23;
Spiess and Affleck-Graves 1995, 243).
Similar behavior was also documented in a survey of CFOs done by Graham and
Harvey (2001). In this survey, CFOs reported that they issue equity following stock price
increases because they believe that the terms of the equity are more favorable in this
situation. Two-thirds of the CFOs reported that when they decide to issue common
stock, the level of overvaluation or undervaluation of the firm's stock by the market is
important or very important. In general, the CFOs reported that stock prices are more
important than 9 out of 10 factors considered in the decision to issue equity. Brav,
Graham, Harvey, and Michaely (2004) also surveyed CFOs and found that CFOs reported
that they repurchase their stock when it is at a good value relative to its true value.
However, Graham's (1999; 2000) surveys showed that on average only 3% of
CFOs believed that their firm was overvalued. In addition, on average about 70% of the
CFOs believed that their firm was undervalued. These surveys were taken during a time
period of massive overvaluation of equity (Jenson 2005, 5). If CFOs did not believe their
firm was overvalued when the market as a whole was overvalued, then managers taking
advantage of new shareholders and planning to issue overpriced stock is not a common
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cause of underperformance following equity issue. A more likely explanation is that
there are times when managers and investors are overly optimistic about the value of
new stock issues.
Managerial overoptimism can lead to poor stock performance following equity
financing. Optimistic managers are shown to consistently estimate the probability of
good outcomes higher than the market. This leads to optimistic managers believing that
the capital market is undervaluing their firm's stock. Because of this, these managers
prefer debt when external financing is necessary. Since overoptimistic managers tend
to believe they have many good projects available for investing, even though they prefer
debt they may turn to equity financing if pre-issue leverage is excessively high and debt
financing becomes too costly or even unavailable.
Many of the factors that lead to managerial overoptimism also lead to investor
overoptimism. Some examples of this include good past firm performance and the level
of firm growth. In addition, the investors may overvalue firms if they are unaware that
the firm's overoptimistic managers are taking on projects that do not truly have a
positive net present value. Loughran and Ritter (1997) and Hertzel, Lemmon, Linck, and
Rees (2002) found that firms issuing equity had above average expenditures both before
and after an equity issue which gives evidence that both the managers and investors are
overly optimistic about the success of new investments. All of these factors together
can lead to both the managers and the investors being overly optimistic about the firm
at the same time which leads to lower stock performance after an equity issue.
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1.3 Purpose and Objectives of the Study
This study focuses on what motivates managers when they are making external
equity and debt decisions.

It investigates whether the motivation for the decisions

about capital structure are driven by market timing or managerial overoptimism. This is
done by focusing on equity and debt issues and whether these issues bring the firms
closer to or farther away from their optimal capital structure. A firm that issues external
financing that moves it closer to its optimal capital structure could be timing the market,
favoring or avoiding debt, or optimizing their capital structure.

A firm that issues

external financing that moves it away from its optimal capital structure is timing the
market, favoring debt, or avoiding debt. This study focuses on the firms that issue
external financing that moves the firm farther away from its optimal capital structure to
see if the results support the Market Timing Theory or the Managerial Overoptimism
Theory.
To achieve the purposes of this study, the following is analyzed:
1. One and three year post-financing buy-and-hold adjusted returns using two
different methods to match the sample to non-finance issuing firms.
2. One and three year post-financing buy-and-hold adjusted returns with the
analysis period broken into five, seven year periods.
3. One, two, and three year post-financing stock performance based on the
four-factor model using the three Fama and French factors (1993) and a
momentum factor (Carhart, 1997).
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4. One, two, and three year post-financing stock performance related to excess
leverage, controlling for two different sets of firm characteristics.
5. Post-financing stock performance related to excess leverage for both small
and large firms (controlling for firm characteristics).
6. The correlation between the excess leverage proxy and the press proxy for
manager overoptimism.

1.4 Contributions of the Study
This study builds on Gombola and Marciukaityte (2007) who examined whether
managerial overoptimism affects the choice between debt and equity financing. These
authors restricted their study to examining whether financing choice can help explain
poor post-financing stock performance in high growth firms since these firms are the
most likely to be affected by managerial overoptimism. Gombola and Marciukaityte
find that their debt financing sample significantly underperforms their equity financing
sample. Their findings are consistent with the hypothesis that managerial overoptimism
affects the choice between debt and equity financing and explains some of the poor
post-financing performance.
This study broadens the scope beyond Gombola and Marciukaityte's (2007) work
to provide more insight and explanation for what influences manager when they are
making decisions about issuing external financing.

One way this is done is by the

inclusion of all firms that issued external financing (subject to sample criteria) in the
1970 to 2004 time period. Testing a wide range of firms broadens the implications of
the conclusions.

Also, the longer time period further ensures that the results are

9

persistent across time. Second, rather than comparing debt and equity issues, this study
looks at whether firms move closer or farther away from their optimal capital structure
when they issue external financing. This allows for the separation of firms that are
optimizing their capital structure from those that are timing the market for greater
insight into the manager's behavior and the resulting stock performance.

Third, this

study uses Malmendier and Tate's (2008) methodology of examining press releases
mentioning manager confidence or caution to measure manager overoptimism. This
gives an extra measure of managerial overoptimism to demonstrate the robustness of
the results.
In order to determine whether firms are moving closer to or farther away from
their optimal capital structure when they issue external financing, this study uses the
model presented in Baker and Wurgler (2002). This model estimates the predicted
change in book leverage which is a continuous measure that shows whether a firm is
predicted to issue debt or equity before the external financing event. Following Di,
Goodwin, and Marcuikaityte (2009), the absolute value but opposite sign of this
measure is used to give an estimate of excess leverage which is defined as the
difference between the firm's leverage and its optimal leverage. This study finds that
the excess leverage before external financing is negatively related to the post-financing
stock performance. This result is consistent with the Managerial Overoptimism Theory
and remains significant for both small and large firms.
The results of this study show that a firm that is predicted to issue debt to move
toward their optimal capital structure but instead issues equity has better stock
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performance than a firm that is predicted to issue equity and does issue equity. In
addition, the results show that a firm that is predicted to issue equity but instead issues
debt performs worse than a firm that is predicted to issue debt and does issue debt.
These results also support the Managerial Overoptimism Theory. The difference in
returns between firms that are predicted to issue equity and firms that are predicted to
issue debt cannot be explained by the four factor model including three Fama and
French (1993) factors and a momentum factor (Carhart 1997, 57).
This study examines press releases mentioning manager optimism or caution
(Malmendier and Tate 2008, 24) as a proxy for overoptimism. The results show that the
excess leverage proxy (Di, Goodwin, and Marcuikaityte 2009, 26) and the press proxy for
managerial overoptimism are related with a positive correlation. These findings suggest
a relationship between the excess leverage proxy and the press proxy for overoptimism
and support the validity of the excess leverage proxy as a measure of managerial
overoptimism.
This study evaluates what influences managers when they are making decisions
about issuing external financing.

This question is analyzed using many different

evaluation criteria. Overall, the results are opposite to the predictions of the Market
Timing Theory and consistent with the Managerial Overoptimism Theory.

1.5 Plan of Study
The remainder of the study is organized as follows. Chapter 2 reviews prior
studies of capital structure.

It includes theoretical background on capital structure

theories such as the Tradeoff Theory, Pecking Order Theory, Market Timing Theory, and
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Managerial Overoptimism Theory.

This chapter also includes relevant empirical

evidence from earlier studies. Chapter 3 describes the hypotheses and sample as well
as detailing the methodology for testing the Market Timing Theory and the Managerial
Overoptimism Theory. Chapter 4 presents the results and the analysis of the results.
Finally, Chapter 5 summarizes the findings of this study and discusses its implications.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

The firm's mix of different forms of long-term financing is known as its capital
structure. The goal of a capital structure policy is to find the combination of securities
that will maximize firm value. None of the existing capital structure theories completely
explain firm behavior when a firm makes financial decisions that change the firm's
capital structure.

2.1 Capital Structure Theories
Capital structure theories focus on two areas. One area stresses that there is an
optimal capital structure for each company and the company should always be making
changes to try to achieve this optimal value. The other area does not center on a target
capital structure. Instead this area explains capital structure through a variety of market
and manager influences that are based on asymmetric information. Each of the capital
structure theories that have been proposed combine these two areas in different ways
to explain what a firm takes into consideration when making capital structure decisions.
2.1.1 Optimal Capital Structure Target
The first area of capital structure theory focuses on an optimal capital structure
target.

Modigliani and Miller (1958) did the first work that proposed that capital
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structure has an optimal target. The research in this area has focused on finding the
optimal capital structure for a firm to minimize their cost of capital or to maximize the
firm value by using a mixture of debt and equity financing. The optimal capital structure
is determined by various tradeoffs between the costs and benefits of debt versus equity.
Modigliani and Miller (1958) explored how capital structure affects the cost of
capital.

Their work showed that in perfect capital markets with no taxes, capital

structure does not affect cost of capital or company value. In this scenario, capital
structure essentially does not matter and capital goes to the most efficient users.
Modigliani and Miller (1963) added corporate taxes to the analysis.

This addition

changed their conclusion about capital structure. The interest tax shield causes the
value of the firm to increase with the increase of interest on the debt being carried.
Therefore, the firm value is maximized when the firm is financed entirely with debt.
Miller (1977) incorporated personal taxes in to the analysis. This addition showed that
the optimum capital structure could be either at 0% debt or 100% debt thereby shifting
the conclusion back to capital structure being irrelevant. DeAngelo and Masulis (1980)
incorporated the addition of tax shields other than interest payments on debt. This
study found optimal levels of capital structure that are a mix of debt and equity.
Schneller (1980) also found optimal levels of capital structure as a mix of debt and
equity when personal and capital gains taxes were considered with respect to default
conditions.
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2.1.1.1 Tradeoff Theory
Modigliani and Miller's (1958) seminal work together with many others led to
the formulation of the static Tradeoff Theory. The Tradeoff Theory suggests that firms
seek more debt as long as the benefits of debt are greater than the costs of debt.
Agency conflicts between stock holders and bond holders and potential bankruptcy
costs are the costs of debt and the reduction of free cash flow agency problems and the
tax deductibility of interest are the benefits.

Firms identify optimal leverage by

weighing the costs and benefits of an additional dollar of debt (Fama and French 2002,
1).

2.1.1.2 Agency costs
Agency costs are the incentive problems that results from the separation of
ownership and control. Jensen and Meckling (1976) was the first to address agency
costs. They defined agency costs as the sum of the cost for the shareholders of the firm
to monitor the managers, the cost for the managers to show their good intentions to
the shareholders, and residual loss. The two agency relationships that are most relevant
to capital structure are the relationship between the stockholders and the managers
and the relationship between the stockholders and the bondholders.
Jensen and Meckling (1976) analyzed the impact of conflict

between

stockholders and managers by comparing the behavior of a manager who owns 100% of
a firm's equity with that of a manager who sells a portion of the equity to outsiders. The
authors found that agency costs are the lowest when a firm is owned entirely by its
managers and employees. Agency costs go up with each issue of outside equity. There

15
are also agency costs associated with the possibility of financial distress when debt is
issued, but these costs are lower than those associated with outside equity. This study
found evidence that the probability distribution of the firm's cash flows is not
independent of its ownership structure. The authors argue that an optimal amount of
leverage is associated with a minimum amount of agency cost.
Jensen (1986) proposed the free cash flow theory as a way to reduce agency
costs.

The author focused on the conflict of interest that develops between

shareholders and managers over the choice of corporate strategy. Free cash flow is
cash flow in excess of the amounts required to fund all projects that have a positive net
present value. Managers have the incentive to use this excess cash flow to grow the
firm beyond its optimal size. This study found that free cash flow must be paid out to
shareholders if the firm is to be efficient and to maximize its share price. This payout
reduces the amount of resources that the managers control. This reduction in control
reduces the manager's power and makes them more subject to monitoring by the
capital markets when additional investments are needed for new capital. The problem
is how to compel the managers to pay out cash to stakeholders instead of investing in
negative net present value projects.
2.1.2 Information Asymmetry
The second area of capital structure theory is based on information asymmetry.
Information asymmetry occurs when one group has better information about a subject
than other groups. Myers and Majluf (1984) recognized the information asymmetry
between managers and potential shareholders and used it to develop a signaling model
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that combines investment and financing decisions. Investors learn information about
the value of the firm's assets from the managers through their financing choices. Since
the managers are supposed to act in the best interest of existing shareholders, the
issuing of equity signals the potential investor that the firm's opportunities are risky and
the manager wants to share the risk with new investors. It also indicates to investors
that the manager thinks that the firm's shares are overpriced. This study implies that
issuing equity signals lack of internal funds and weakness which leads to the decline of
share prices. Conversely, the issuing of debt signals that the manager has confidence in
the future cash flows and their ability to make fixed payments.
2.1.2.1 Pecking Order Theory
Myers (1984) was the first to formally propose the Pecking Order Theory. This
theory states that corporate financing choices are driven by the costs of adverse
selection. The costs of adverse selection arise as a result of information asymmetry
between managers and investors, costs of issuing equity, and transaction costs. These
costs overwhelm the costs and benefits proposed by the tradeoff model. Pecking Order
Theory is based on the view that information asymmetries between new investors and
managers who maximize the wealth of existing shareholders make equity issues more
costly than debt issues and therefore imply a financial hierarchy. The author argues that
in order to reduce asymmetric information costs, firms will prefer to use their retainedearning to finance growth opportunities. If more financing is required, risk-free debt
will be used first, then risky debt, and only under duress outside equity.
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The Pecking Order Theory assumes perfect financial markets except for
asymmetric information. This theory predicts that firms will avoid issuing equity so that
they do not run into the dilemma of either passing up positive net present value
projects or issuing stock at a price they think is too low. The hierarchy in this theory
leads to a firm's capital structure depending on its history. This can be seen by looking
at a very profitable firm and an unprofitable firm in a slow growth industry.

The

profitable firm does not have any incentive to issue debt and retire equity and will end
up with a low debt ratio. On the other hand, the unprofitable firm will end up with a
high debt ratio (Su 2004, 37).
2.1.2.2 Literature evaluating the
Tradeoff Theory
Numerous studies have been done to evaluate the validity of and improve upon
the Tradeoff Theory. Most research in this area focuses on establishing whether firms
have a target capital structure.

Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman (2001), Titman and

Tsyplakov (2006), Kayhan and Titman (2007), and Leary and Roberts (2005) are a
representation of the literature that finds that firms have a target capital structure and
actively try to move towards it. Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman (2001) found that when
a firm issues or retires a significant amount of new capital, they make choices that move
them toward a target debt ratio. These choices offset any profit based changes to the
capital structure. Leary and Roberts (2005) looked at how transaction costs factor into
capital structure decisions. This study found that adjustment costs lead to firms taking
between two and four years to adjust their capital structure after stock price changes
and other events that move leverage away from the firm's target. Kayhan and Titman

18
(2007) also evaluated what elements keep firms from hitting their target. This study
found that cash flows, investment needs, and stock price realizations lead to significant
deviations from the target. The changes in leverage were shown to partially persist for
at least ten years. Titman and Tsyplakov (2006) and Fama and French (2002) also found
that firms move towards their optimal capital structure target very slowly after events
that move the firm away from its target.
Hovakimian (2004) and Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2008) both found
evidence that did not support the Tradeoff Theory. Instead these studies found that
firm's capital structure is persistent over long periods of time at a level that is not
optimal.

Hovakimian (2004) found that it appears that company capital structure

decisions can be predicted by the company's existing debt levels. Firms that issue or
repurchase equity were found to have low debt ratios and firms with high debt ratios
tended to issue and retire debt. Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2008) found that firms
do not change their leverage very much and they tend to remain in the same area
(either high or low) for over 20 years. This persistent finding was found to be present
prior to the IPO.

This suggests that variation in capital structures is primarily

determined by factors that remain stable for long periods of time.
2.1.2.3 Literature evaluating the Pecking
Order Theory
The Pecking Order Theory proposes that there is a hierarchy to management's
financing choices. Cai and Ghosh (2003), Lemmon and Zender (2008), Leary and Roberts
(2005), and Frank and Goyal (2003) are a representation of studies that find moderate
to full support for the Pecking Order Theory. Leary and Roberts (2005) found that firms
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utilize external capital markets only when they have large investment needs. Cai and
Ghosh (2003) found evidence that the optimal level of capital structure is a range of
zero to the industry mean and that firms preferred to use internal funds. Frank and
Goyal (2003) found that larger, older firms tend to use debt financing when external
financing is required. Evidence was found to support the Pecking Order Theory in the
1970s and 1980s because this type of firm made up a majority of the sample during this
time period. In the 1990s support for the Pecking Order Theory declined because more
small unprofitable firms were publically traded. Smaller, younger, high-growth firms
were found to use equity because of the restricted amount of debt available to them.
Equity was found to be more important in the 1990s even when the sample was
restricted to the largest quartile of firms. Lemmon and Zender (2008) also found that
small, high-growth firms do frequent equity issues to meet their capital needs. Their
results showed that for all other types of firms, the Pecking Order Theory describes their
financing behavior over a long period of time. These firms are looking internally first to
obtain financing. If additional capital is required, the firms issue debt, with some firms
raising their leverage ratio way past the optimal target even when transaction costs for
equity are low.
Contrary to the previously discussed results, Fama and French (2005) found
evidence that did not support the Pecking Order Theory. This study found that more
than half of a firm's financial decisions violated the Pecking Order Theory. Equity issuers
were not often under duress and repurchases were not limited to firms with low
demand for outside financing. It was observed that most firms issue or retire equity
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each year. Most of this activity is from firms making issues to employees, doing rights
issues, or implementing direct purchase plans.

These financial decisions have low

transaction costs and low asymmetric information but they do change capital structure.
When a firm does do a SEO it is usually large and not typically done by firms under
duress. This study suggests that the Pecking Order Theory and the Tradeoff Theory
should be considered together to try to explain firm capital structure decisions.
Byoun (2008) addressed Fama and French's suggestion by testing the Pecking
Order Theory and the imbalance of cash flows which leads to financial surpluses and
deficits. This study found that most adjustments of capital structure occur when firms
are above their debt ratio target and have a financial surplus or when they are below
their debt ratio target and have a financial deficit. It was found that firms that were
above their target use all of their financial surpluses to pay off debt. Firms that were
below their target were found to retire both debt and equity with their financial
surpluses. Firms that have high adjustment costs or financial constraints were found to
use internal funds more often than firms with low adjustment costs or few financial
constraints. The author concludes that the evidence shows that firms are influenced by
transaction costs and adverse selection costs associate with information asymmetry but
not in the way dictated by the Pecking Order Theory.
Graham and Harvey (2001) evaluated capital structure decisions by interviewing
CFOs. This study found that the CFO responses do not entirely support either the
Tradeoff Theory or Pecking Order Theory but a mix of these theories. The survey found
that 37% of the respondents have a flexible target debt ratio, 34% have a somewhat
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tight target or range, and 10% have a strict target. The executives reported that tax
effects are relatively important but they did not rate the costs of bankruptcy or agency
costs as important to capital structure decisions. So this implies that the CFOs are
concerned with the benefits but not the costs in the Tradeoff Theory. Executives also
reported that they used internal resources first and then turned to external financing.
In addition, CFOs reported that they did not issue equity if they felt that the market was
undervaluing their firm. Both of these behaviors support the Pecking Order Theory.
The evidence shows that the Pecking Order Theory and the Tradeoff Theory,
separately or together, cannot explain all firm capital structure decisions. This has led to
other capital structure theories being proposed.

The Market Timing Theory and the

Managerial Overoptimism Theory are two of these theories. The Market Timing Theory
proposes that managers time their equity issues to take advantage of periods of high
stock prices and investor overoptimism.

The Managerial Overoptimism Theory puts

forth the idea that managers that are overoptimisitic about their firm's ability to
generate positive net present value projects and believe that their equity is undervalued
prefer to issue debt rather than equity.
2.1.2.4 Market Timing Theory
Several authors have completed empirical work that suggests that managers
time their equity issues to take advantage of periods of high stock prices and investor
overoptimism (e.g., Ritter 1991, 3; Loughran and Ritter 1995, 23; Spiess and AffleckGraves 1995, 243). This behavior does not support the Tradeoff Theory. When stock
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price goes up, the debt ratio of the firm goes down. Therefore, in this scenario the
Tradeoff Theory would predict that a firm should issue debt.
Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman (2001) found that stock prices play an important
role in determining a firm's financing choice. Firms that experience large stock price
increases are more likely to issue equity and retire debt than firms that experience stock
price declines. Korajczyk and Levy (2003) showed that this does not apply to all firms.
These authors found that firms who are financially constrained will have to accept
market prices when they are in need.
The "windows of opportunity" hypothesis (Ritter 1991, 3) proposes that the best
time for a firm to make an equity offering is when a firm's equity is overpriced.
Managers know more about their firm value than investors do so they can time equity
offerings when the market is over optimistic about their firm's shares. This hypothesis
suggests that investors are slow to react to the information contained in the
announcement of the equity issue.

Ritter (1991) found that firms doing an IPO

underperform matching firms for three years after the first day of public trading. This
underperformance is even stronger for firms going public in years with heavy IPO
activity. The "windows of opportunity" hypothesis agrees with Jensen's (1986) agency
hypothesis when it predicts worse post issue performance after equity issue. Free cash
flow problems should be worse after equity issues than debt issues.
Loughran and Ritter (1995) and Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995) gave evidence
to show that if equity is over-priced and the market under reacts to equity issues, then
management maximizes the wealth of existing shareholders by issuing equity. These
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studies found that average annual return for firms issuing an IPO or SEO was
significantly lower than investing an equal amount for the same period of time with a
matched non-issuing firm. This underperformance was found even after controlling for
industry, firm size, trading system, offer size, issuing firm's age and book-to-market
ratio. These results are consistent with the conclusion that managers are issuing equity
when a firm's stock is overvalued based on their knowledge of firm specific information.
Hertzel, Lemmon, Linck, and Rees (2002) found evidence that, similar to IPOs
and SEOs, public firms that place equity privately have lower post-financing stock
performance. However, contrary to the results for IPOs and SEOs, it was found that the
firms issuing equity privately tend to do it following poor firm performance.
The evidence from these studies suggests that no matter what form of equity is
issued (IPO, SEO, or private placement) investors are too optimistic about the future of
the firms that are issuing equity. Loughran and Ritter (1997) and Hertzel, Lemmon,
Linck, and Rees (2002) also investigated the capital expenditures of firms before and
after they issued equity.

They found that firms issuing equity had above average

expenditures both before and after the equity issue which gives evidence that both the
managers and investors are overly optimistic about the success of the new investments.
Although empirical evidence of underperformance following equity issuance is
consistent with the "windows of opportunity" hypothesis, underperformance following
debt issuance is not consistent with this hypothesis. Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1999)
found stock underperformance of 14% over 5 years for straight debt issuers matched by
size and book-to-market and convertible debt offerings were found to underperform by
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37%. Datta, Iskandar-Datta, and Raman (2000) found post-issue underperformance for
initial debt offerings. Managers do not have better knowledge of debt financing than
the investor since the cost of debt financing depends primarily upon market interest
rates and not specific firm performance.

Therefore the "windows of opportunity"

hypothesis cannot fully explain the post-financing underperformance of debt that has
been shown empirically.
Baker and Wurgler (2002) were the first to study how capital structure is
affected by firms timing their equity issues based on market levels. This study found
that firms with low amounts of debt obtained external financing when their market-tobook ratio was high and firms with high amounts of debt obtained external financing
when their market-to-book ratio was low. The timing of equity issues by firms was
found to have a large and persistent effect on capital structure that lasts beyond 10
years. The conclusion drawn is that a firm's capital structure is a result of manager's
cumulative attempts to time equity issues.
Other authors have studied how firm capital structure is affected by firm's
efforts to time the market. Hovakimian (2006) argues that equity issues do not have
any persistent effects on capital structure. The explanatory power of the weighted
average market-to-book used in Baker and Wurgler (2002) occurs because it contains
information about growth opportunities which is not captured by the current market-tobook ratio. Alternatively, Alti (2006) focuses on IPOs in hot and cold markets to see if
firms are practicing market timing and how this affects capital structure. In this study, it
was found that IPOs issued during a hot market were 3.7 percentage points more
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underleveraged than those issued during a cold market. However, the results showed
that one year after an IPO, less than one-half of the effect remains. Two years after the
IPO, the effect is completely reversed.
Dittmar and Thakor (2007) proposed a different idea for what is occurring when
stock prices are high. These authors suggested that when stock prices are high is the
time when investors are most likely to agree with management decisions. Managers
use equity to finance projects when they believe that investors' views about project
payoffs are likely to be aligned with theirs which is when operating performance and
stock prices are high. This study found that firms with high level of agreement between
investors and managers issue equity regardless of their stock price.
2.1.2.5 Managerial Overoptimism Theory
Heaton (2002) formally proposed the Managerial Overoptimism Theory, which is
a corollary to the asymmetric information theory. This theory suggests that managers
that are overoptimisitic about their firm's ability to generate positive net present value
projects and believe based on their inside knowledge of the company that their equity is
undervalued, prefer to issue debt rather than equity.

Managers are defined as

optimistic when they systematically overestimate the probability of good firm
performance and underestimate the probability of bad firm performance.

For

overoptimistic managers to believe that their firm is undervalued, they need to be more
overoptimistic than the market about the value of their firm.

Hackbarth (2004)

presented a theoretical proof of how overoptimistic managers choose higher debt levels
and issue debt more often.
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Overconfidence is defined to be the belief that the precision of a person's
information is greater than it actually is or that a person puts more weight on their
information than is warranted. Overconfident people do not give proper recognition to
what they do not know and rely too heavily on what they do know (Russo and
Schoemaker 1992, 7). Optimism is defined as the belief that favorable future events are
more likely than they actually are. Most theories of financial economics, including many
capital structure theories, assume that managers are extremely good at processing
information, are rational beyond the ability of most humans, and are motivated solely
by self-interest. These assumptions are often inaccurate (Gervais, Heaton, Odean 2007,

Executives appear to be particularly prone to displaying overconfidence. Russo
and Schoemaker (1992) tested managers across many different industries and found
that more than 99% of the managers were overconfident. This finding is attributed to
three factors: the illusion of control, a high degree of commitment to good outcomes,
and abstract reference points that make it hard to compare performance across
individuals (Alicke, Klotz, Breitenbecher, Yurak 1995, 804).

In addition, it has been

found that CEOs that personally pick an investment project are likely to believe that
they can control its outcome and therefore underestimate the probability of failure
(March and Shapira 1987, 1404). Furthermore, most CEOs are highly committed to
good company performance because their personal wealth fluctuates with the
company's stock price (Malmendier and Tate 2005, 2661).
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There are several reasons why managers are more likely to be overconfident
when making capital structure decisions. First, capital budgeting decisions often require
projecting cash flows for a wide range of uncertain outcomes. This makes the problems
complex and difficult which are the types of problems that tend to make people
overconfident. Second, capital budget decisions are not conducive to learning. Capital
budgeting decisions are not frequently made, have a long delay before feedback is
given, and the feedback is often noisy. In addition, it is easy for managers to assume
that each situation is new and not apply information from past decisions. Third, it is
easy for managers to overestimate how responsible they are for their own success.
Successful managers are likely to be promoted or move to higher positions in other
companies (Gervais, Heaton, Odean 2007,1).
Overoptimistic managers are found to perceive that their firm's stock is
undervalued by the market. This leads managers to possibly turn down positive net
present value projects that must be financed externally. Optimistic managers overvalue
their own corporate projects and may wish to invest in negative net present value
projects even when they are loyal to shareholders (Heaton 2002, 33).

Also,

overoptimistic managers underestimate the uncertainty about a potential project, this
leads to them making the decision to move forward with a project faster than an
unbiased manager (Gervais, Heaton, Odean 2007, 1).

These managers tend to

overinvest if they have sufficient internal funds for investment and are not disciplined
by the capital market or corporate governance mechanisms (Heaton 2002, 33).
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Managerial overoptimism

can be difficult to

measure.

Oliver (2005),

Malmendier and Tate (2005), and Malmendier and Tate (2008) developed proxy
measures to be used to identify optimistic managers.

Oliver (2005) utilized the

consumer sentiment index as a proxy of manager confidence. The author found that
consumer sentiment index was significant in explaining firm financing decisions. As
predicted by the Managerial Overoptimism Theory, it was found that when confidence
is higher, firms have higher levels of debt.

Malmendier and Tate (2005) measures

managerial overconfidence by looking at how long CEOs hold options compared to
thresholds for early exercise.

Malmendier and Tate (2008) measure managerial

overoptimism by using press coverage in leading business publications to see which
CEOs outsiders perceive as optimistic or cautious. Malmendier, Tate, and Yates (2007)
utilized both of these methodologies to measure manager optimism. The authors found
that conditional on accessing public markets, CEOs who personally overinvest in their
companies are significantly less likely to issue equity. These CEOs raise 33 cents more
debt to cover an additional dollar of financing deficit than their peers. These results
were confirmed with the press proxy methodology.
Gombola

and

Marciukaityte

(2007)

directly

test

whether

managerial

overoptimism affects the choice between debt and equity financing in high growth firms
to see whether it can help explain poor post-financing stock performance. The results
from this study show that the debt financing sample significantly underperforms the
equity financing sample. The findings suggest that managerial overoptimism affects the
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choice

between

debt

and equity

financing and explains poor

post-financing

performance in high growth firms.
Oliver (2005) also investigated what relationships there are between managerial
overoptimism and external financing decisions but with a different sample of firms than
Gombola and Marciukaityte (2007). Oliver utilized a sample of the largest 500 US firms
that existed across the entire 25 year study period. None of the firms used would be
expected to be high growth firms. With this data set, the author was able to explain
21% of the variation in company leverage using a managerial confidence proxy and
market-to-book ratio.

2.2 Summary
Management of capital structure is an important part of maximizing the firm
value.

Financial research has proposed many theories that explain aspects of firm

behavior when a firm makes financial decisions that change the firm's capital structure.
However, none of the theories fully explain why firms with similar fundamental
characteristics make different financing choices.
The Market Timing Theory suggests that firms issue stock when the market is
overvaluing a firm and repurchase equity when the firm is undervalued.

Empirical

evidence shows that firms issue equity when stock price has gone up. In addition,
evidence shows that firms underperform for three to five years following IPO, SEO, and
private equity issues. The evidence on the persistence of the Market Timing Theory is
mixed.

Some studies show that market timing has a long term affect on capital
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structure while others show that there is no affect or it is reversed in just a few years. In
addition, this theory does not explain the underperformance of firms after debt issue.
The Managerial Overoptimism Theory suggests that overoptimistic managers
prefer to issue debt rather than equity due to their belief that the firm stock price is too
low based on their insider knowledge of the firm's ability to generate positive net
present value projects.

Empirical evidence shows that manager confidence is a

significant predictor of leverage level and that overoptimistic managers rely on internal
financing first and issue more debt than equity when external financing is necessary. In
addition, evidence shows that high growth firms that issue debt underperform those
that issue equity.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODS

3.1 Hypotheses
This study focuses on what motivates managers when they are making external
financing decisions. It is investigated whether the motivation for the decisions about
capital structure are driven by market timing or managerial overoptimism. The debt
and equity decisions of a firm are investigated based on if the decision brings the firm
closer to or further away from their optimal capital structure. When a firm makes an
external financing decision, there are four scenarios that can occur:

a firm that is

expected to issue debt does issue debt, a firm that is expected to issue debt issues
equity, a firm that is expected to issue equity issues debt, and a firm that is expected to
issue equity does issue equity. The predictions of the Market Timing Theory and the
Managerial Overoptimism Theory are summarized in Table 3.1.
Myers and Majlufs (1984) signaling model provides background for the Market
Timing Theory and the Managerial Overoptimism Theory.

Managers know the true

value of the firm's assets and growth opportunities better than anyone outside of the
firm. The information asymmetries can cause good firms to be undervalued by capital
markets because prices will reflect average quality.

If the undervaluation is large

enough, issuing equity to finance a new project might result in the new shareholders
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capturing more than the net present value of the new project, leaving the old
shareholders at a loss.

Managers avoid issuing securities that they believe are

underpriced and avoid sharing the value added from good investment opportunities
with outside investors.

Table 3.1. Scenario predictions for the Market Timing Theory and the Managerial
Overoptimism Theory
Scenario
1. Firm issues equity when debt
financing is predicted

Market Timing Prediction
•
•

Managers are timing the
market
Worse post-financing stock
performance than scenario 2

•
•
•

Managerial Overoptimism
Prediction
Managers are avoiding debt
Managers are less optimistic
than in scenario 2
Better post-financing stock
performance

2. Firm issues equity when equity
financing is predicted

•

Optimizing capital structure

•

Optimizing capital structure

3. Firm issues debt when equity
financing is predicted

•

Managers are timing the
market
Better post-financing stock
performance than scenario 4

•
•
•

Managers are choosing debt
despite excess leverage
Managers are overoptimistic
Worse post-financing stock
performance than in
scenario 4

Optimizing capital structure

•

Optimizing capital structure

•

4. Firm issues debt when debt
financing is predicted

•

3.1.1 Market Timing Theory
Studies suggest that managers time equity issues to take advantage of high stock
prices and investor overoptimism (e.g., Ritter 1991, 3; Loughran and Ritter 1995, 23;
Spiess and Affleck-Graves 1995, 243).

Ritter (1991) offered the "windows of

opportunity" hypothesis that suggests the timing of equity issues when the shares are
overpriced leads to poor post IPO stock price performance. Since managers know more
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about their firm's value than investors do, they can time equity offerings when the
market is overly optimistic about the firm. This hypothesis suggests that investors are
slow to react to the information contained in the announcement of the equity issue.
Loughran and Ritter (1995) and Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995) showed that
the "windows of opportunity" hypothesis also applies to SEOs and Hertzel, Lemmon,
Linck, and Rees (2002) found that it applies to private equity placement. These studies
gave evidence to show that if equity is over-priced and the market under reacts to
equity issues, then management maximizes the wealth of existing shareholders by
issuing equity. These results are consistent with the conclusion that managers are
issuing equity when a firm's stock is overvalued and issuing debt when a firm's stock is
undervalued based on their knowledge of firm specific information.
Baker and Wurgler (2002) studied how capital structure is affected by firms
timing their equity issues based on market levels. This study found evidence that firms
are timing their equity issues and that it has a large and persistent effect on capital
structure that lasts beyond 10 years. A strong negative correlation was found between
leverage and a measure of historical market valuations. The conclusion drawn is that a
firm's capital structure is the result of manager's cumulative attempts to time equity
issues.
The "windows of opportunity" hypothesis predicts that managers will time the
market by choosing between debt and equity financing based on investor optimism and
the level of stock prices. A firm that issues external financing that moves it closer to its
optimal capital structure could be timing the market, favoring or avoiding debt, or
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optimizing their capital structure. A firm that issues external financing that moves it
away from its optimal capital structure is timing the market, favoring debt, or avoiding
debt. Market Timing Theory predicts that when a firm issues equity when it is expected
to issue debt to move towards optimal capital structure, then the stock price is
overvalued and there will be lower post-financing stock performance. This theory also
predicts that when a firm issues debt when it is expected to issue equity to move
towards optimal capital structure, then the stock price is undervalued and there will be
higher post-financing stock performance.
3.1.2 Managerial Overoptimism Theory
The managerial overoptimism hypothesis was formalized by Heaton (2002). In
this hypothesis, optimistic managers are shown to consistently estimate the probability
of good outcomes higher than the capital market. This leads to optimistic managers
always believing that the capital market is undervaluing their firm's stock.

These

managers prefer debt when external financing is necessary. The first choice of these
managers is risk-free debt since it is not subject to the beliefs of the manager. Risky
debt is the second choice because it is a weighted combination of equity and risk-free
debt making it less undervalued than equity.

These preferences lead to optimistic

managers making capital structure decisions that closely follow the Pecking Order
Theory. These managers fund positive net present value projects first with internal
funds. Managers may not fund positive net present value projects if the project cannot
be financed with internal cash flow. If it is decided to secure external financing, the
managers utilize risk-free debt, then risky debt, and finally equity.
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The Managerial Overoptimism Theory has very different predictions than the
Market Timing Theory.

Firms that are predicted to issue equity to move closer to

optimal capital structure are more likely than other firms to have a history of primarily
issuing debt. These firms are more likely to be managed by overoptimistic managers
since these managers avoid issuing equity and rely primarily on debt to meet their
external financing needs. The described characteristics of an overoptimistic manager
lead to the prediction that these managers are more likely to issue debt when the firm is
predicted to issue equity than managers that issue debt when the firm is predicted to
issue debt.

On the other hand, the managers that issue equity when the firm is

predicted to issue debt are more pessimistic than the mangers that issue equity when
their firm is predicted to issue equity.

Therefore, the Managerial Overoptimism Theory

predicts that firms that are predicted to issue equity will have higher managerial
overoptimism and lower post-financing stock performance than firms that are predicted
to issue debt.

3.2 Sample
The data for this project spans the fiscal years from 1970 to 2004. An externalfinancing sample is examined where equity and debt financing are obtained from
Compustat balance sheet data.

Examining this type of sample allows for the

consideration of the sum of all financing activities during one year instead of just one
financing event.
This sample was created by first identifying all firms that were in the Compustat
and CRSP databases during the 1970-2004 time period. Firms are dropped from the
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sample if data pertaining to total assets (item 6), the firm's permanent number, start of
fiscal year, SIC code, or return are missing or the SIC code is less than zero. Firms are
also dropped if the beginning of year book-to-market ratio, total long term debt (item
9), debt in current liabilities (item 34), current year total assets, beginning of year total
assets, current year common equity (item 60), current year retained earnings (item 36),
or the beginning of year capitalization are missing. Also, regulated utilities (SIC codes
4910-4949) and financial firms (SIC codes 6000-6999) are excluded. In addition, firms
with beginning of year total assets lower than $10M and common equity lower than
$10M, before the external finance issue, are excluded.
The sample includes firm years with debt or equity financing equal to or greater
than 10% of a firm's total assets at the beginning of the year. One-year equity financing
is defined as the change in common equity minus the change in retained earnings. Oneyear debt financing is defined as the change in total debt. Firms that obtained both
debt and equity financing in the same year equal to or greater than 10% of their
beginning of year total assets are excluded. Financing events for the same firm are
required to be at least three years apart. When a firm has more than one event in any
four-year period, only the earliest event is included. In addition, firm-years where the
predicted change in leverage, as calculated by Baker and Wurgler's (2002) model,
cannot be estimated are excluded.
Applying the described restrictions to the data produced a sample of 11,373
external financing issues. The data sample is described in Table 3.2. Panel A gives a
calendar break down of the data with further detail showing the type of financing issued

37
and whether the firm is predicted to increase or decrease leverage. The data shows that
external financing issues increase over time, hitting a peak in the 1995-1999 time
period. This time period includes over 25% of the events. The break down shows that
about two-thirds of the firms are predicted to increase leverage. It also shows that
firms are not strictly making their financing decisions based on optimal capital structure.
Panel B shows how the data is distributed across industries. About 40% of the firms are
from business services, electronic and other electric equipment, chemicals and allied
products, industrial machinery and equipment, and oil and gas extraction. Panel C, D, E,
and F describe the mean and the median for several firm characteristics. Total assets,
market value of equity, market-to-book of equity, and liabilities are estimated at the
beginning of Year 0. External financing is the sum of equity and debt financing. Equity
financing is the change in common equity minus the change in retained earnings in Year
0. Debt financing is the change in total debt in Year 0. External financing, equity
financing, and debt financing are estimated during a fiscal year and normalized by
beginning of year total assets.
Comparing the firms that are predicted to increase leverage to those that are
predicted to decrease leverage, the data shows that firms that are predicted to decrease
leverage tend to be larger, have higher market value of equity, have a higher market-tobook ratio, and have a higher amount of liabilities compared to their total assets. When
firms that issued debt are compared to those that issued equity, the data shows that
firms that issued debt are on average larger, have a higher market value of equity, and
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have a higher amount of liabilities compared to their total assets. Those that issued
equity have a higher market-to-book ratio.

Table 3.2. Calendar distribution of financing samples
Panel A: Calendar Distribution
External-Financing Sample
Predicted to
Increase
Leverage,
N
Years
1970-1974
1975-1979
1980-1984
1985-1989
1990-1994
1995-1999
2000-2004

Total

Predicted to
Decrease
Leverage,
N

Debt-Financing Sample
Predicted to
Increase
Leverage,
N

Predicted to
Decrease
Leverage,
N

Equity-Financing Sample
Predicted to
Increase
Leverage,
N

Predicted to
Decrease
Leverage,
N

%

%

%

%

%

%

571
7.60%
643
8.56%
770
10.25%
1,052
14.01%
1,092
14.54%
1,912
25.46%
1,469
19.56%

295
7.63%
378
9.78%
452
11.70%
549
14.21%
570
14.75%
966
25.00%
654
16.93%

519
11.14%
583
12.52%
562
12.07%
803
17.24%
600
12.71%
1,052
22.58%
539
11.57%

257
9.60%
341
12.74%
330
12.33%
446
16.67%
336
12.56%
649
24.25%
317
11.85%

52
1.82%
60
2.10%
208
7.30%
249
8.73%
492
17.26%
860
30.16%
930
32.62%

38
3.20%
37
3.11%
122
10.27%
103
8.67%
234
19.70%
317
26.68%
337
28.37%

7,509
100%

3,864
100%

4,658
100%

2,676
100%

2,851
100%

1,188
100%
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Table 3.2 (continued)
Panel B: Industry Distribution

Industry

SIC
Code

Business services

73

Electronic and other electric
equipment

36

Chemicals and allied products

28

Industrial machinery and
equipment

35

Oil and gas extraction

13

Instruments and related
products

38

Communications

48

Wholesale trade-durable goods

50

Health services

80

Food and kindred products

20

External-F inancing

Debt-Financing

Equity-Fina ncing

Sam pie

Sample

Samphe

Predicted to
Increase
Leverage,
N

Predicted to
Decrease
Leverage,
N

Predicted to
Increase
Leverage,
N

Predicted to
Decrease
Leverage,
N

Predicted to
Increase
Leverage,
N

Predicted to
Decrease
Leverage,
N

%

%

%

%

%

%

763
10.16%
840
11.19%
634
8.44%
663
8.83%
355
4.73%
488
6.50%
176
2.34%
191
2.54%
160
2.13%
220
2.93%

361
9.34%
276
7.14%
191
4.94%
265
6.86%
157
4.06%
134
3.47%
188
4.67%
174
4.50%
84
2.17%
114
2.95%
1,920
49.7%

221
4.74%
431
9.25%
267
5.73%
416
8.93%
248
5.32%
241
5.17%
120
2.58%
143
3.07%
90
1.93%
185
3.97%

137
5.12%
156
5.83%
122
4.56%
176
6.58%
110
4.11%
81
3.03%
143
5.34%
133
4.97%
60
2.24%
90
3.36%
1,468
54.9%

542
19.01%
409
14.35%
367
12.87%
247
8.66%
107
3.75%
247
8.66%
56
1.96%
48
1.68%
70
2.46%
35
1.23%
723
25.4%

224
18.86%
120
10.10%
69
5.81%
89
7.49%
47
3.96%
53
4.46%
45
3.79%
41
3.45%
24
2.02%
24
2.02%
452
38.1%

2,676
100%

2,851
100%

1,188
100%

Other

3,019 64.8%

Total

7,509
100%

3,864
100%

2,296 49.3%
4,658
100%

Panel C: Firm Characteristics, Means
External Financinig Sample

Total assets, $M
Market value of equity, $M
Market-to-book of equity
Liabilities / Total assets, %
External financing, %
Equity financing, %
Debt financing, %

Predicted to Increase
Leverage

Predicted to Decrease
Leverage

594

1,439

796

1,645

2.17

2.61

35.02%

61.09%

37.17%

37.17%

21.19%

20.18%

15.98%

16.99%

Difference
-845***
(-3.87)
-849***
(-4.87)
-0.44***
(-5.41)
-26.07%***
(-84.10)
0.00%
(0.00)
1.01%
(0.41)
-1.01%*
(-1.74)

40
Table 3.2 (continued)
Panel D: Firm Characteristics, Means
Equity1 Financing Sample

Debt Financing Sample

Total assets, $M
Market value of equity, $M
Market-to-book of equity
Liabilities / Total assets, %
External financing, %
Equity financing, %
Debt financing, %

Predicted to
Increase
Leverage
771

Predicted to
Decrease
Leverage
1,835

852

1,827

1.57

1.67

38.68%

63.62%

26.73%

27.27%

-0.16%

0.26%

26.89%

27.01%

Difference
-1,064***
(-3.38)
-975***
(-4.29)
-0.10***
(-3.31)
-24.94%***
(-77.94)
-0.54%
(-0.71)
-0.42%***
(-2.80)
-0.12%
(-0.16)

Predicted to
Increase
Leverage
310

Predicted to
Decrease
Leverage
561

706

1,241

3.14

4.70

29.12%

55.48%

53.98%

59.13%

55.55%

64.38%

-1.57%

-5.25%

Difference
-251***
(-2.99)
-535**
(-2.21)
-1.56***
(-6.53)
-26.36%***
(-40.54)
-5.15%
(-0.68)
-8.83%
(1.17)
3.68%***
(10.82)

Panel E: Firm Characteristics, Medians
External Financing Sample
Predicted to Increase
Leverage

Predicted to Decrease
Leverage

Total assets, $M

78

130

Market value of equity, $M

113

121

Market-to-book of equity

1.56

1.41

Liabilities / Total assets, %

35.12%

61.90%

External financing, %

20.50%

19.12%

Equity financing, %

2.17%

1.32%

Debt financing, %

12.15%

13.42%

Difference

-52
(-0.24)
-8
(-0.05)
0.15**
(1.85)
-26.78%***
(-86.39)
1.38%
(0.56)
0.85%
(0.35)
-1.27%**
(-2.19)
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Table 3.2 (continued)
Panel F: Firm Characteristics, Medians
Equity Financing Sam|lie

Debt Financing Sample
Predicted toi
Increase
Leverage
99

Predicted to
Decrease
Leverage
150

Difference

Predicted to
Increase
Leverage
60

Predicted to
Decrease
Leverage
95

Difference

-51
-35
(-0.16)
(-0.42)
94
99
-5
134
155
-21
Market value of equity, $M
(-0.02)
(-0.09)
1.27
2.37
1.90
0.47**
1.30
0.03
Market-to-book of equity
(1.97)
(1.00)
39.23%
-23.82%***
57.99%
-31.71%***
63.05%
26.28%
Liabilities / Total assets, %
(-74.44)
(-48.78)
18.72%
18.92%
20.06%
7.49%
-0.20%
27.55%
External financing, %
(0.99)
(-0.25)
0.20%
0.20%
28.86%
23.05%
5.81%
0.00%
Equity financing, %
(0.77)
(0.00)
-1.24%
1.24%***
18.01%
18.04%
-0.03%
0.00%
Debt financing, %
(-0.04)
(3.65)
1)
This table presents the sample for the study. The sample consists of the external financing issues in the 1970-2004 time
period. Firms are included only if they are present in both the Compustat and CRSP databases. Firms are dropped from the
sample if data pertaining to total assets (item 6), the firm's permanent number, start of fiscal year, SIC code, or return are
missing or the SIC code is less than zero. Firms are also dropped if the beginning of year Fama French book-to-market ratio,
total long term debt (item 9), debt in current liabilities (item 34), current year total assets, beginning of year total assets,
current year common equity (item 60), current year retained earnings (item 36), or the beginning of year capitalization are
missing. Also, regulated utilities (SIC codes 4910-4949) and financial firms (SIC codes 6000-6999) are excluded. In addition,
firms with beginning of year total assets lower than $10M and common equity lower than $10M before the external finance
issue are excluded. The sample includes firm years with debt or equity financing equal to or greater than 10% of a firm's total
assets at the beginning of the year. One-year equity financing is defined as the change in common equity minus the change in
retained earnings. One-year debt financing is defined as the change in total debt. These firm years are defined as the event
year (Year 0). Firms that obtained both debt and equity financing in the same year equal to or greater than 10% of their
beginning of year total assets are excluded. Financing events for the same firm are required to be at least three years apart.
When a firm has more than one event in any four-year period, only the earliest event is included. In addition, firm-years where
the expected change in leverage, as calculated by Baker and Wurgler's (2002) model, cannot be estimated are excluded. Panel
A details the calendar distribution of events. Panel B breaks down the sample to show the distribution of events across the
two-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes.
Total assets, $M

2)

3)

Panel C, D, E, and F describe the mean and median for select characteristics of sample firms. Total assets, market value of
equity, market-to-book of equity, and liabilities are estimated at the beginning of Year 0. External financing is the sum of
equity and debt financing. Equity financing is the change in common equity minus the change in retained earnings in Year 0.
Debt financing is the change in total debt in Year 0. External, equity, and debt financing are estimated during a fiscal year and
normalized by total assets at the beginning of that year.
* * * , **, and * Significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively (based on t-statistics).

3.3 Methodology
In this study several methodologies are used to investigate whether the
motivation for external financing decisions are driven by market timing or managerial
overoptimism. This is done through evaluation of post-financing buy-and-hold adjusted
returns, calendar time abnormal returns, OLS regressions relating post-financing stock
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performance to excess leverage, and estimates of managerial overoptimism through
press coverage of firms.
3.3.1 Book Leverage versus Market
Leverage
Book leverage rather than market leverage is used in this study to predict
changes in capital structure. Graham and Harvey (2001) surveyed CFOs and found that
the majority reported that they do not rebalance their equity when its value changes in
the market. Welch (2004) looked at empirical evidence and also found that firms do not
actively manage their capital structure based on changes in stock price. In addition, by
focusing on book leverage, this study avoids the bias that could be caused by market
leverage when a firm's stock is over or undervalued. A firm that is at its optimal capital
structure when it is measured based on book leverage but has overpriced stock will be
predicted to issue debt based on its market leverage. Using the market leverage will
lead to results that show lower post-financing stock performance for firms that are
predicted to issue debt since the stock will be overvalued on average. The prediction of
lower post-financing stock performance for firms that are predicted to issue debt is
made by the Market Timing Theory. Therefore, using market leverage would bias the
results to show evidence for the Market Timing Theory.
3.3.2 Predicting Debt or Equity Issue
To estimate predicted leverage changes, this study uses the model presented in
Baker and Wurgler (2002). An estimate of the predicted leverage change is found by
modeling the annual changes in book leverage. This is a continuous measure that shows
whether a firm is predicted to issue debt or equity before the external financing event.
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The beginning of year market-to-book, asset tangibility, profitability, size, and book
leverage are used to predict this change. The model is formulated in Equation 3.1.

/D\

/D\

/M\

/PPE\

/EBITDA\

U y - (AU =0+^ ( B U + "» (—U + ^ (-A-V, +
P«log(S)y.1 + p5 ( j )

(3.1)

The dependent variable is the change in book debt in year y divided by total
assets. Book debt is defined as total assets minus book equity. Book equity is defined
as total assets minus total liabilities plus preferred stock, deferred taxes, and convertible
debt. Redemption value of preferred stock is used when preferred stock is missing.
Firm years with book leverage above one are dropped.
The independent variables in this model are market-to-book, asset tangibility,
profitability, size, and previous year book leverage. Market-to-book (M/B) is defined as
assets minus book equity plus market equity all divided by total assets. Asset tangibility
(PPE/A) is defined as net plant, property, and equipment divided by total assets.
Profitability (EBITDA/A) is defined as earnings before interest, taxes, and depreciation
divided by total assets. Size (S) is defined as the log of net sales.
This methodology focuses on market-to-book as the main determinant of annual
changes in leverage. Asset tangibility, profitability, and firm size are used as control
variables based on findings by Rajan and Zingales (1995) who showed evidence that
these variables are correlated with leverage.
Following Di, Goodwin, and Marciukaityte (2009), this study uses a proxy of excess
leverage for managerial optimism. This proxy is calculated by taking the opposite sign of the
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absolute value of the predicted change in leverage during Year 0. This is a measurement of
the excess leverage at the end of Year -1.
3.3.3 Buv-and-Hold Abnormal Returns
Buy-and-hold abnormal return measures the average multi-year return for
investing for a pre-specified holding period in firms that obtained external financing
versus investing in otherwise similar firms that did not obtain external financing. Barber
and Lyon's (1997) methodology is utilized to calculate buy-and-hold abnormal returns.
Barber and Lyon (1997) promote the use of an appropriately matched control
firm for abnormal return analysis. This type of matching avoids some biases that can be
encountered if reference portfolios are used. These biases include:
1. New Listing or survivorship bias - index includes new firms after the event date
and the sample does not. Firms that go public are typically small, high growth
firms that have been show to underperform the market.
2. Rebalancing bias - compound returns on the portfolio are calculated assuming
periodic rebalancing and the sample compounds without rebalancing. This can
lead to inflated long-horizon returns which could be due to bid/ask spread or
non-synchronous trading.
3. Skewness bias - distribution of long-run abnormal returns are positively skewed.
4. Measurement bias - this is usually the result of using arithmetic averages instead
of geometric averages in compounding.
Barber and Lyon (1997) and Lyon, Barber, and Tsai (1999) identify a method of
measuring long-run abnormal return that yields well specified test statistics. This is
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done by matching a single control firm for each sample firm based on (1) size, (2) size
and book to market, (3) size, book-to-market, and prior return, (4) size and industry.
This method of matching alleviates new listing bias because both the sample and the
control firm must be listed in the event month. The rebalancing bias is addressed since
both the financing firm and the control firm are compounded in an analogous fashion.
The skewness bias is addressed since abnormal returns calculated using this method are
reasonably symmetric. The disadvantage of this approach is that it assumes that the
sample firms are growing at the same pace with the matching firms. Also, this approach
cannot eliminate the measurement bias associated with cumulative abnormal return.
Li and Probhala (2006) point out that there is nothing inherently wrong with
multi-dimensional matching methods.

These methods involve the same economic

assumptions as other matching methods based on propensity scores. The dimensionby-dimension matching actually impose less structure. There are two difficulties with
multi-dimension matching methods.

First, characteristics are not always exactly

matched in corporate finance applications. At each level of matching the biases build
up. Second, as the number of dimensions to be matched goes up, finding matches
becomes difficult or even infeasible. These authors point out that when matching is not
feasible, a convenient alternative is methods based on propensity scores. Propensity
score matching handle the problems caused by multi-dimension matching by reducing
the match to a single propensity score.
A variety of matching methods are being used in empirical studies that look at
abnormal return. Li and Zhao (2005) argue that the multi-dimensional matching makes
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it difficult to match simultaneously on multiple dimensions. To address this problem
they implement the propensity score matching based on size, book-to-market ratio, and
past returns because these are the factors that affect both a firm's decision to issue new
equity and the estimated abnormal returns after SEOs. Lie (2005) on the other hand
produces two sets of control firms through his matching method. The first set is
matched based on two-digit SIC code that has book value of assets closest to the sample
firm. The second set is based on two-digit SIC code and the firm that has similar preevent performance characteristics and market-to-book ratios. Savor and Lu (2009) also
utilize a multi-dimensional method by evaluating abnormal return by matching firms
based on two-digit SIC code, 50-150% of market value of equity, and book-to-market
ratio.
For this study, the firms are matched based on size, prior return, and book-tomarket ratio.

Three steps are used to create the matched sample.

First, ten size

(market value of equity) portfolios are formed each month from CRSP firms. Each
portfolio has the same number of firms. Second, each size portfolio is divided into five
prior-return portfolios.

Each firm that obtains external financing is assigned to the

corresponding size and prior-return portfolio. Third, within the assigned portfolio the
firms that obtained external financing are matched to the firm with the closest book-tomarket ratio.
The matched firms are required to meet the same industry, size, and data
availability restrictions as the external financing firms to avoid biasing the estimates of
abnormal return. In addition, the matched firms cannot obtain equity or debt financing

47
that is equal to or greater than 10% of their beginning of year assets in the three years
before or after the financing year. The market value of equity and the book-to-market
of equity are calculated at the beginning of Year 0 to follow Barber and Lyon's (1996)
suggestion that matching for an abnormal stock performance analysis should be done
before the event. The book-to-market of equity is estimated following Fama and French
(1993). The prior returns are raw returns that are calculated during the six month
period ending at the beginning of Year 0.
The buy-and-hold return (BHR) is calculated for each firm that issued external
financing and its matching firm using Formula 3.2. Formula 3.3 is used to calculate the
buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR).

BHRUb = [n!U(l + Ru)] " 1

(3.2)

BHARj a b = B H R s a m p l e a b - B H R m a t c h a b

(3.3)

BHRia,b is the buy-and-hold return for firm i during the period from month a to b. Rj,n is
the monthly stock return for firm i in month n. The abnormal return is the difference in
buy-and-hold returns of the sample firms that issue external financing and their match.
When a sample or match firm does not have returns available for the whole buy-andhold period, the buy-and-hold returns for the longest period available is used (e.g.,
Hertzel, Lemmon, Linck, and Rees 2002, 2595). This provides a measure of abnormal
performance that is closer to investor experience than a measure excluding firms
without returns for the whole buy-and-hold period.
In addition to the BHAR for the entire external financing sample, the BHAR is
calculated for the sample of firm-years with predicted increase in leverage and for the
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sample of firm-years with predicted decrease in leverage. Furthermore, the difference
in BHAR between the sample restricted to firm-years with predicted increase in leverage
and the sample restricted to firm-years with predicted decrease in leverage is
calculated.

T-tests are used to evaluate the statistical significance of means and

differences in means.
3.3.3.1 Robustness of the BHAR calculation
using alternate matching
methodology
One influence on the capital structure for a firm is the type of industry in which
the firm is operating. Firms tend to have similar capital structures to their peers in the
same industry (Ross, Westerfield, and Bradford 2008, 577). In order to determine if
matching external finance issuing firms to firms that do not issue external financing in a
different industry is affecting the BHAR results, a different matching method is done
which incorporates the firm's industry. To do this a method similar to the methodology
utilized by Savor and Lu (2009) is used. The analysis is done by first matching the
external financing firms with non-external financing firms within the same 2-digit SIC
code. Then only the potential matches with a market value of equity that is within 70130% of the sample firm is considered. Finally, the firm with the closest book-to-market
ratio is chosen as the match.
3.3.3.2 Robustness of the BHAR calculation
during specific time periods
In order to determine if time period affects the results of the BHAR analysis, five
additional BHAR analyses are done. To do this the thirty-five year study period is broken
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into five, seven year time periods. The BHAR is calculated for the 1970-1976, 19771983,1984-1990,1991-1997, and 1998-2004 time periods.
3.3.4 Calendar-Time Abnormal Returns
The method of buy-and-hold abnormal returns utilized in this study accurately
represents investor experience but is sensitive to cross-sectional dependence.

The

calendar-time abnormal return procedure has more power to identify reliable evidence
of abnormal return since it accounts for dependence of event-time abnormal returns.
The drawback of this procedure is that it yields an abnormal return measure that does
not precisely measure investor experience (Lyon, Barber, and Tsai 1999, 165; Mitchell
and Stafford 2000, 287).
To take advantage of the strength of both tests, a calendar-time abnormal return
analysis is utilized as a robustness check of the BHAR results. This is done by accessing if
the four-factor model which consists of the three Fama and French (1993) factors and a
momentum factor (Carhart 1997, 57) can explain the difference in returns. The model is
formulated in Equation 3.4.
Rdn = ai + Pi(R m n - R f n ) + SiSMBn + hjHMLn + UiUMDn + £ in

(3.4)

In Equation 3.4, Rdn is the difference in the average returns for month n between
the post-financing stock performance of the sample restricted to firm-years with
predicted increase in leverage and the post-financing stock performance of the sample
restricted to firm-years with predicted decrease in leverage.

This difference is

calculated by first identifying the external financing issues that belong to each sample.
The samples are additionally restricted to those firms that have an absolute value of the

50
predicted change in leverage greater than two. Then for each issue in the sample
restricted to firm-years with a predicted increase in leverage, the twelve months
following the end of Year 0 are identified and the returns for those months are
obtained.

Next the average return for each calendar month is calculated.

This

procedure is repeated for the sample restricted to firm-years with predicted decrease in
leverage. Then the difference between the average return for each month are found.
This procedure is also used to estimate the difference in returns for two and three year
post-financing periods.
In Equation 3.4, (Rmn - RfJ is the excess return on the market, SMBn is the
difference in returns between a portfolio of small and large stocks, HMLn is the
difference in returns between high and low book-to-market stocks, and UMDn is the
difference in returns between high and low prior return portfolios. The data for the
excess return on the market and the SMBn, HMLn, and UMDn factors are obtained from
Kenneth

French's

web

site.

This

web

site

is

http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html.

found

at

Fama and

French (1993) describe the estimation procedure for SMBn and HMLn and Carhart (1997)
describes the estimation procedure for UMDn.
The regression yields parameter estimates of a i; Pi, s„ hi7 and Uj. The value of the
intercept a represents the difference in monthly returns between the firms expected to
increase leverage and those that are expected to decrease leverage not explained by
the four factor model. This value is zero under the null hypothesis of no abnormal
performance. A positive intercept indicates that after controlling for market, size, book-
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to-market, and momentum factors, the firms that are predicted to increase leverage
performed significantly different than the firms that are predicted to decrease leverage.
The implied difference in returns is also calculated for the one, two, and three
year post financing periods. Equation 3.5 is used to calculate the implied abnormal
return.

where a is the intercept and n is the number of months in the estimation period.
3.3.5 Evaluating Buv-and-Hold Returns
Using an OLS Regression Model
The firm characteristics detailed in Table 3.2 suggests that firms that are
predicted to increase leverage have quite different characteristics than firms that are
predicted to decrease leverage. An OLS regression model is used to control the firmspecific characteristics to assure that the difference in post-event performance between
firms that are predicted to increase and decrease leverage are not driven by the
differences in firm characteristics.

This OLS regression will examine the relation

between post-financing stock performance and predicted change in leverage.

The

model is formulated in Equation 3.6.

BHARj>a>b = a + p^EQy + /?2 \EL ( ^ ) j

+ B3(DEQ)y + ft (^-)

+ /?5(log (f)) y -i + /?6(log (MVE))y_t

(3.6)

The dependent variables are one to three year post-financing buy-and-hold
abnormal returns using the size, prior return, and book-to-market matched sample.

52
Buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHARja,b) is the difference between the BHRs for the
external financing firm and the matched firm. The control variables include external
financing level, logarithm of market-to-book ratio, and logarithm of market value of
equity. Excess leverage (EL) at the beginning of Year 0 has the same absolute value but
the opposite sign than the predicted change in leverage during Year 0. The variable
excess leverage times the ratio of equity financing to external financing is a cross
product to test for different affects by debt versus equity. External financing (EX) is the
sum of equity and debt financing. Equity financing (EQ) is the change in common equity
minus the change in retained earnings in Year 0. Debt financing is the change in total
debt in Year 0. External financing, equity financing, and debt financing are estimated
during a fiscal year and normalized by total assets at the beginning of that year. The
dummy for equity financing (DEQ) is equal to 1 if in a year, a firm issues equity that is
equal to or exceeds 10% of the firm's total assets and equal to 0 otherwise. The dummy
for equity financing indicates the performance of equity versus debt. The market-tobook of equity (M/B) and the market value of equity (MVE) are estimated at the
beginning of Year 0.
3.3.5.1 Further evaluation of BHAR using an
OLS regression model
Frank and Goyal (2007a) examined the factors that are important to leverage
decisions. These authors found six core factors that explain more than 27% of the
variation in leverage. The factors include industry median leverage, market-to-book
assets ratio, tangibility, profits, firm size, and expected inflation which were shown to
have consistent sign and significance across many different tests. In order to further
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examine the relationship between post-financing stock performance and predicted
change in leverage these factors are used as control variables. The model is formulated
in Equation 3.7.

BHARjiaib = a +

faWy

P* Oy.!

+ /? 2 (£L(g)) y + P3(DEQ)y + fa(IL)y-i + foO^y-i +
+

frCWy-i + PBQ°S (FS))y-i + MEOy-i

(3.7)

BHAR, EL, EX, EQ, and DEQ are defined as in Equation 3.6. The industrial median
leverage (IL) is the median total debt to market value of assets determined by four digit
SIC code and year.

Market value of assets is the sum of price-close times shares

outstanding, debt in current liabilities, long-term debt, and preferred-liquidation value
minus deferred taxes and investment tax credit. Tangibility (TG) is the ratio of net
property, plant, and equipment to total assets. The market-to-book assets ratio (M/B) is
the ratio of the market value of assets to total assets. Profitability (PF) is the ratio of
operating income before depreciation to total assets. Firm size (FS) is the logarithm of
total assets. The expected inflation (El) is the expected change in the consumer price
index over the coming year.

Data is obtained from the Livingston Survey at

http://www.phil.frb.org/econ/liv/index.html.

This is the only macroeconomic factor

included and the least reliable factor based on it being calculated based on an annual
observation when so much more data is available. All of the control variables are
estimated at the beginning of Year 0.
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3.3.5.2 Robustness of the OLS regression
models using the matched firms
In order to determine if the OLS regression results are affected by the difference
in firm characteristics between the external finance issuing firms in the sample and the
size, prior return, and book-to-market matched non-external finance issuing firms, the
OLS regression analyses are repeated using the non-external finance issuing matched
firms. The only change is that the dummy variable for external financing is excluded
since none of the matched firms issue external financing.
3.3.5.3 Size robustness of the OLS
regression models
In order to determine if firm size affects the results of the OLS regression, two
additional OLS regression analyses are done. One analysis is done for a sample of small
firms and one analysis is done for a sample of large firms. Small and large firms are
defined in relation to the mean of the market value of equity. Small firms are the
smallest 25% of the firms and large firms are the largest 25% of the firms.

3.4 Alternative Measures of Managerial Overoptimism
Managerial overoptimism is difficult to measure.

Many factors can affect

leverage levels other than market timing and managerial overoptimism. Some of these
factors include: firms having limited access to external financing, transaction costs, and
macro economic factors such as interest rate. To check the validity of the results found
when the excess leverage proxy is used, this study assesses how an alternate measure of
managerial overoptimism relates to the excess leverage proxy.
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3.4.1 Press Releases
Malmendier and Tate (2008) developed a methodology to measure managerial
overoptimism. This methodology uses press coverage in leading business publications
to see which CEOs outsiders perceive as confident or cautious. While this method is
noisy and subjective, it adds value by measuring CEO beliefs as perceived by outsiders.
This study implements Malmendier and Tate's methodology by searching the
LexisNexis Major U.S. and World Publications and News Wire Service databases. The
search criteria includes the CEO's last name, the company name, and words that
describe managerial optimism or caution. Words that are searched for in the optimistic
category

are

"confident,"

"overconfidence,"

"overconfident,"

"confidence,"

"optimistic," "overoptimistic," "overoptimism," or "optimism." The cautious category
includes articles that contain the words "reliable," "cautious," "conservative,"
"practical," "frugal," or "steady."

Each article is reviewed to insure that these

descriptive words are not contradicting each other and are being used in reference to
the CEO and/or the company. The number of articles that fall into each category for
Years -2, - 1 , 0, and 1 are recorded.
Since announcements of substantial financing may affect the press coverage of
the CEOs, the financing year is excluded from this analysis to avoid endogeneity
problems (Malmendier and Tate 2008, 24). In addition, managers of firms that are
planning to obtain external financing, in spite of their true opinion, are very unlikely to
express pessimistic opinions and are likely to express optimistic opinions. To avoid this
bias, the pre-financing years are not included in this study. Therefore, this study will
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focus on the characterization of managers by the press in the year after the external
financing event.
The CEO information for this study is obtained from the ExecuComp database.
The external financing sample is matched with the available firm information in the
ExecuComp database.

Firms that have different CEOs in Year -1 and Year 0 are

excluded. The study is limited to firms that have at least $1,000M total assets at the
beginning of Year 0 (427 firms) because small firms are rarely mentioned in the press.
At least one article with an optimistic or cautious mention is found for 86 firms.
Malmendier and Tate (2008) also found a relatively small number of firms mentioned in
the press. A summary of the press release data can be found in Table 3.3.
In order to estimate the press proxy for managerial overoptimism, articles are
collected for each external financing event. These articles are read and the number of
optimistic CEO mentions and cautious CEO mentions are recorded. The difference
between the number of optimistic mentions and cautious mentions for each year is
used to determine if the CEO is classified as optimistic (>0), cautious (<0), or
inconclusive (0). From this difference the indicator for the press proxy overoptimism
variable is developed. This dummy variable is equal to 1 if the CEO is classified as
optimistic and 0 otherwise. The press proxy for overoptimism is calculated by taking the
ratio of the difference in the number of optimistic and cautious mentions in a year to
the sum of the optimistic and cautious mentions in that same year.
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Table 3.3. Press release data summary
Total
Number of
Articles
Number of
Companies

575

YearO

Yearl

Confident
228

Cautious
64

Confident
219

Cautious
64

427

YearO

Mean

Median

Minimum

Maximum

Indicator for
Press Proxy
Press Proxy
Confident
Mentions
Cautious
Mentions

0.164

0

0

1

Standard
Deviation
0.371

0.119
0.534

1
0

-1
0

1
22

0.708
1.926

0.150

0

0

10

0.732

Yearl

Mean

Median

Miinimum

Maximum

Standard
Deviation
0.364

Indicator for
0.157
0
0
1
Press Proxy
1
0.105
-1
1
0.720
Press Proxy
0.513
0
0
Confident
18
1.936
Mentions
0.150
0
Cautious
0
8
0.669
Mentions
This table summarizes the data obtained by using Malmendier and Tate's (2008) methodology to measure
managerial overoptimism through press releases. The first variable, Indicator for Press Proxy, is a
measure of the confidence of the CEO in the year of and year after the external financing. This variable is
a dummy variable that is equal to 1 when the number of articles that mention such words as "confident"
and "optimistic" is greater than the number of articles that mention such words as "reliable" and
"practical." The second variable, Press Proxy, is the difference between the number of articles that
mention such words as "confident" and "optimistic" and the number of articles that mention such words
as "reliable" and "practical" divided by the number of articles in both groups for a particular year.

CHAPTER 4

RESULTS

4.1 Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Return
In order to determine whether the capital structure position of the firm affects
post-financing stock performance, the difference in buy-and-hold abnormal returns is
tested for the sample of firms that are predicted to increase leverage and for the sample
of firms that are predicted to decrease leverage. The Market Timing Theory predicts
that when a firm issues equity when it is predicted to issue debt to move towards
optimal capital structure, the stock price is overvalued and there will be lower postfinancing stock performance. This theory also predicts that when a firm issues debt
when it is predicted to issue equity to move towards optimal capital structure, the stock
price is undervalued and there will be higher post-financing stock performance.
Whereas, the Managerial Overoptimism Theory predicts that firms that are predicted to
issue equity but instead issue debt will have worse post-financing stock performance
than firms that issue equity. This theory also predicts that firms that are predicted to
issue debt but instead issue equity will have better post-financing stock performance
than firms that issue debt.
The results of this analysis, shown in Table 4.1, support the Managerial
Overoptimism Theory. The buy-and-hold abnormal returns are estimated by taking the
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difference of the buy-and-hold return for the external finance issuing sample and the
buy-and-hold return for a matched firm that does not issue external financing. These
firms are matched using a methodology suggested by Barber and Lyons (1997) which
uses size, prior return, and book-to-market values.

The results show that in the first

post-financing year, firms expected to increase leverage that instead issue equity
underperform matched firms by 4.69%. Firms that are expected to decrease leverage
and issue equity underperform matched firms by 10.18%. Therefore, as predicted by
the Managerial Overoptimism Theory, firms that issue equity when they are predicted
to issue debt significantly out-perform firms that issue equity and are predicted to issue
equity by 5.49%. On the other hand, in the first post-financing year, firms expected to
decrease leverage that instead issue debt, underperform matched firms by 6.94%.
Firms that are expected to increase leverage and issue debt underperform matched
firms by 3.78%. Therefore, as predicted by the Managerial Overoptimism Theory, firms
that issue debt when they are predicted to issue equity perform significantly worse than
firms that issue debt and are predicted to issue debt by 3.16%. The results in the third
post-financing year follow the same pattern and also support the Managerial
Overoptimism Theory.
In addition, consistent with earlier post-financing performance studies (e.g.
Loughran and Ritter 1995, 23; Spiess and Affleck-Graves 1995, 243; Spiess and AffleckGraves 1999, 45), the results show that firms perform poorly for at least three years
after obtaining substantial debt or equity financing. For all break downs of number of
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years, type of financing, and predicted change in leverage, the buy-and-hold abnormal
return samples underperform matched firms significant at the 1% level.

Table 4.1. Post-financing buy-and-hold adjusted returns
External Financing
Sample

Firm-Years with
Predicted Increase
in Leverage

Firm-Years with
Predicted Decrease
in Leverage

Difference

Panel A: One-Year Buy-and-Hold Adjusted Returns
Mean
(r-statistic)
No. of obs.

-5.41%***
(-5.88)
11,351

-4.12%***
(-3.53)
7,529

-7.94%***
(-5.41)
3,822

3.82%**
(2.033)

Panel B: Three-Year Buy-and-Hold Adjusted Returns
Mean
(t-statistic)
No. of obs.

-11.67%***
(-6.74)
11,351

-10.66%***
(-5.11)
7,529

-13.66%***
(-4.42)
3,822

3.00%
(0.802)
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Table 4.1 (Continued)
Equity Financing
Sample

Firm-Years with
Predicted Increase
in Leverage

Firm-Years with
Predicted Decrease
in Leverage

Difference

Panel A: One-Year Buy-and-Hold Adjusted Returns
Mean
(t-statistic)
No. of obs.

-6.29%***
(-3.31)
4,038

-4.69%**
(-1.98)
2,858

-10.18%***
(-3.32)
1,180

5.49%*
(1.403)

Panel B: Three-Year Buy-and-Hold Adjusted Returns
Mean
(t-statistic)
No. of obs.

-18.08%***
(-5.92)
4,038

-17.36%***
(-4.86)
2,858

-19.81%***
(-3.38)
1,180

Debt Financing
Sample

Firm-Years with
Predicted Increase
in Leverage

Firm-Years with
Predicted Decrease
in Leverage

2.45%
(0.357)

Difference

Panel A: One-Year Buy-and-Hold Adjusted Returns
Mean
(t-statistic)
No. of obs.

-4.92%***
(-5.09)
7,313

-3.78%***
(-3.13)
4,671

-6.94%***
(-4.28)
2,642

3.16%*
(1.569)

Panel B: Three-Year Buy-and-Hold Adjusted Returns
Mean
(t-statistic)
No. of obs.

-8.13%***
(-3.89)
7,313

-6.56%**
(-2.57)
4,671

-10.91%***
(-3.01)
2,642

4.35%
(0.980)

This table presents post-financing buy-and-hold size-, prior return-, and book-to-market-adjusted returns
for the external, equity, and debt financing sample. All of these samples are broken down to the sample
restricted to firm-years with predicted increase in leverage, and the sample restricted to firm-years with
predicted decrease in leverage. This table also presents the difference in adjusted returns between the
sample restricted to firm-years with predicted increase in leverage, and the sample restricted to firmyears with predicted decrease in leverage. Predicted change in leverage during a year is estimated using
the Baker and Wurgler (2002) model. The t-test is used to evaluate the statistical significance of means
and differences in means.
* * * , **, and * Significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively (based on tstatistics; one-tail tests for the difference, two-tail tests for other tests).

4.1.1 Calendar-Time Abnormal Return
As a robustness check, the difference in post-event performances between the
sample that was predicted to increase leverage and the sample that was predicted to
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decrease leverage is tested using the four factor model which measures calendar time
abnormal returns. The results (Table 4.2) show a significantly positive intercept which
indicates that after controlling for market, size, book-to-market, and momentum
factors, the firms that are predicted to increase leverage performed significantly
different than the firms that are predicted to decrease leverage. The unexplained
difference in performance is statistically significant at the 1% level for at least three
post-financing years. Implied returns suggest that the sample expected to decrease
leverage underperforms the sample expected to increase leverage by 8% in the first
post financing year and by 20% during the three post financing years.
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Table 4.2. Calendar-time abnormal returns
Rdn = oct+ A(/? m n - Rfn) + stSMBn + htHMLn + UiUMDn + eb

One-year returns
Implied one-year AR
Two-year returns
Implied two-year AR
Three-year returns
Implied three-year AR

at
(t-statistic)

Pi
(t-statistic)

st
(t-statistic)

hi
{t-statistic)

Ui
(t-statistic)

0.690***
(3.02)
8.60%

-0.264***
(-4.90)

0.172**
(2.49)

-0.268***
(-3.32)

0.0074
(0.15)

0.533***
(2.79)
13.61%

-0.248***
(-5.52)

0.099*
(1.71)

-0.233***
(-3.46)

0.0377
(0.88)

0.525***
(3.28)
20.74%

-0.213***
(-5.63)

0.0677
(1.40)

-0.240***
(-4.41)

0.0413
(1-13)

This table tests whether the four-factor model can explain the difference in the post-financing stock
performance between the sample restricted to firm-years with predicted increase in leverage (negative
excess leverage), and the sample restricted to firm-years with predicted decrease in leverage (positive
excess leverage). Rdn is the difference in the average returns for month n between the post-financing
stock performance of the sample restricted to firm-years with predicted increase in leverage and the postfinancing stock performance of the sample restricted to firm-years with predicted decrease in leverage.
This difference is calculated by first identifying the external financing issues that belong to each sample.
The samples are additionally restricted to those firms that have an absolute value of the predicted change
in leverage greater than two. Then for each issue in the sample restricted to firm-years with a predicted
increase in leverage, the twelve months following the end of Year 0 are identified and the returns for
those months are obtained. Next the average return for each calendar month is calculated. This
procedure is repeated for the sample restricted to firm-years with predicted decrease in leverage. Then
the difference between the average return for each month are found. This procedure is also used to
estimate the difference in returns for two and three-year post-financing periods. (R m n - RfJ is the excess
return on the market, SMBn is the difference in returns between a portfolio of small and large stocks,
HMLn is the difference in returns between high and low book-to-market stocks, and UMDn is the
difference in returns between high and low prior return portfolios. The difference in monthly returns
between the samples not explained by the four factor model is determined by the intercept term a. The
implied difference in returns is estimated for the one- to three-year periods ((1 + a/100) n - 1, where n is
the number of months in the estimation period).
* * * , **, and * Significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively (based on the t
statistics; two-tail tests).

4.1.2 BHAR Analysis Using An Alternate
Matching Methodology
In order to determine if matching external finance issuing firms to non-external
finance issuing firms in a different industry is affecting the BHAR results, a different
matching methodology is utilized which incorporates matching by industry. A BHAR
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analysis is done matching the external financing firms with non-external financing firms
based on industry, market value of equity, and book-to-market ratio.
The results of this analysis are shown in Table 4.3. Similar to when firms are
matched by size, prior return, and book-to-market, the results support the Managerial
Overoptimism Theory.

The results show that in the first post-financing year, firms

expected to increase leverage that instead issue equity underperform matched firms by
5.63%. Firms that are expected to decrease leverage and issue equity underperform
matched firms by 6.86%. Therefore, as predicted by the Managerial Overoptimism
Theory, firms that issue equity when they are predicted to issue debt out-perform firms
that issue equity and are predicted to issue equity by 1.23%. On the other hand, in the
first post-financing year, firms expected to decrease leverage that instead issue debt,
underperform matched firms by 9.07%. Firms that are expected to increase leverage
and issue debt underperform matched firms by 3.51%. Therefore, as predicted by the
Managerial Overoptimism Theory, firms that issue debt when they are predicted to
issue equity perform significantly worse than firms that issue debt and are predicted to
issue debt by 5.56%. The results in the third post-financing year follow the same
pattern and also support the Managerial Overoptimism Theory.
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Table 4.3. Matching robustness for post-financing BHAR
External Financing
Sample

Firm-Years with
Predicted Increase
in Leverage

Firm-Years with
Predicted Decrease
in Leverage

Difference

Panel A: One-Year Buy-and-Hold Adjusted Returns
Mean
(t-statistic)
No. of obs.

-5.65%***
(-5.88)
9,812

-4.36%***
(-5.07)
6,649

-8.35%***
(-5.93)
3,163

3.99%**
(2.12)

Panel B: Three-Year Buy-and-Hold Adjusted Returns
Mean
(t-statistic)
No. of obs.

-8.91%***
(-5.19)
9,812

-6.93%***
(-3.30)
6,649

-13.07%***
(-4.39)
3,163

6.14%**
(1.69)
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Table 4.3 (Continued)
Equity Financing
Sample

Firm-Years with
Predicted Increase
in Leverage

Firm-Years with
Predicted Decrease
in Leverage

Difference

Panel A: One-Year Buy-and-Hold Adjusted Returns
Mean
(t-statistic)
No. of obs.

-5.97%***
(-5.41)
3,699

-5.63%**
(-2.45)
2,664

-6.86%**
(-2.53)
1,035

1.23%
(0.346)

Panel B: Three-Year Buy-and-Hold Adjusted Returns
Mean
(t-statistic)
No. of obs.

-12.48%***
(-4.17)
3,699

-11.51%***
(-3.13)
2,664

-14.99%***
(-3.02)
1,035

Debt Financing
Sample

Firm-Years with
Predicted Increase
in Leverage

Firm-Years with
Predicted Decrease
in Leverage

3.48%
(0.562)

Difference

Panel A: One-Year Buy-and-Hold Adjusted Returns
Mean
(t-statistic)
No. of obs.

-5.45%***
(-5.07)
6,113

-3.51%**
(-2.51)
3,985

-9.07%***
(-5.58)
2,128

5.56%***
(2.587)

Panel B: Three-Year Buy-and-Hold Adjusted Returns
Mean
(t-statistic)
No. of obs.

-6.75%***
(-3.25)
6,113

-3.87%
(-1-55)
3,985

-12.14%***
(-3.27)
2,128

8.27%**
(1.852)

This table presents post-financing buy-and-hold industry, market value of equity, and book-to-market
adjusted returns for the external, equity, and debt financing sample. All of these samples are broken
down to the sample restricted to firm-years with predicted increase in leverage, and the sample restricted
to firm-years with predicted decrease in leverage. This table also presents the difference in adjusted
returns between the sample restricted to firm-years with predicted increase in leverage, and the sample
restricted to firm-years with predicted decrease in leverage. Predicted change in leverage during a year is
estimated using the Baker and Wurgler (2002) model. The t-test is used to evaluate the statistical
significance of means and differences in means.
* * * , **, and * Significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively (based on tstatistics; one-tail tests for the difference, two-tail tests for other tests).
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4.1.3 BHAR Analysis Using Specific Time
Periods
In order to determine if the BHAR results are consistent across the thirty-five
year study period, the study period is broken into five, seven year time periods. The
BHAR results can be seen in tables 4.4, 4.5, 4.6, 4.7, and 4.8. The results from these
analyses are mixed. The one year post-financing results for firms that issued debt
support the Managerial Overoptimism Theory during the entire thirty-five year study
period.

In addition, the three year post-financing results for firms that issued debt

support the Managerial Overoptimism Theory in the 1970-1990 time period. However,
the first year post-financing results for equity issuing firms only support the Managerial
Overoptimism Theory in the 1970-1976 and 1998-2004 time periods.

Further

investigation into the gap in support for the Managerial Overoptimism Theory for equity
issuing firms in the 1977-1997 time period is needed.

Table 4.4. Post-financing BHAR (1970-1976)
nal Financing
Sample

Firm-Years with
„
Predicted Increase
in Leverage

Firm-Years with
„
..
Predicted Decrease
in Leverage

^.„
Difference

Panel A: One-Year Buy-and-Hold Adjusted Returns
Mean
(t-statistic)
No. ofobs.

-5.43%***
(-3.03)
1,084

-2.49%
(-1.15)
718

-11.21%***
(-3.55)
366

8.72%**
(2.278)

Panel B: Three-Year Buy-and-Hold Adjusted Returns
Mean
(t-statistic)
No. ofobs.

-10.30%**
(-2.49)
1,084

-4.89%
(-1.05)
718

-20.91%**
(-2.56)
366

16.02%**
(1.706)
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Table 4.4 (Continued)
Equity Financing
Sample

Firm-Years with
Predicted Increase
in Leverage

Firm-Years with
Predicted Decrease
in Leverage

Difference

Panel A: One-Year Buy-and-Hold Adjusted Returns
Mean
(t-statistic)
No. of obs.

-6.29%***
(-3.31)
116

4.06%
(0.82)
73

-19.14%**
(-2.04)
43

23.20%
(0.763)

Panel B: Three-Year Buy-and-Hold Adjusted Returns
Mean
(t-statistic)
No. of obs.

-18.08%***
(-5.92)
116

6.00%
(0.58)
73

-32.87%**
(-2.07)
43

Debt Financing
Sample

Firm-Years with
Predicted Increase
in Leverage

Firm-Years with
Predicted Decrease
in Leverage

38.87%**
(2.187)

Difference

Panel A: One-Year Buy-and-Hold Adjusted Returns
Mean
(t-statistic)
No. of obs.

-4.92%***
(-5.09)
968

-3.23%
(-1.38)
645

-10.16%***
(-3.02)
323

6.93%
(0.568)

Panel B: Three-Year Buy-and-Hold Adjusted Returns
Mean
(t-statistic)
No. of obs.

-8.13%***
(-3.89)
968

-6.12%
(-1.22)
645

-19.32%**
(-2.14)
323

13.20%
(1.279)

This table presents post-financing buy-and-hold size-, prior return-, and book-to-market-adjusted returns
for the external, equity, and debt financing sample. All of these samples are broken down to the sample
restricted to firm-years with predicted increase in leverage, and the sample restricted to firm-years with
predicted decrease in leverage. This table also presents the difference in adjusted returns between the
sample restricted to firm-years with predicted increase in leverage, and the sample restricted to firmyears with predicted decrease in leverage. Predicted change in leverage during a year is estimated using
the Baker and Wurgler (2002) model. The t-test is used to evaluate the statistical significance of means
and differences in means.
* * * , **, and * Significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively (based on tstatistics; one-tail tests for the difference, two-tail tests for other tests).
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Table 4.5. Post-financing BHAR (1977-1983)
External Financing
Sample

Firm-Years with
Predicted Increase
in Leverage

Firm-Years with
Predicted Decrease
in Leverage

Difference

Panel A: One-Year Buy-and-Hold Adjusted Returns
Mean
(t-statistic)
No. of obs.

-6.23%***
(-3.77)
1,631

-5.48%***
(-2.82)
1,013

-7.46%**
(-2.51)
618

1.98%
(0.558)

Panel B: Three-Year Buy-and-Hold Adjusted Returns
Mean
(t-statistic)
No. of obs.

-5.73%
(-1.43)
1,631

-5.01%
(-0.99)
1,013

-6.92%
(-1.04)
618

1.91%
(0.229)
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Table 4.5 (Continued)

Equity Financing
Sample

Firm-Years with
Predicted Increase
in Leverage

Firm-Years with
Predicted Decrease
in Leverage

Difference

Panel A: One-Year Buy-and-Hold Adjusted Returns
Mean
(t-statistic)
No. of obs.

-4.31%
(-1.35)
324

-5.15%
(-1-27)
195

-3.04%
(-0.59)
129

-2.11%
(-0.321)

Panel B: Three-Year Buy-and-Hold Adjusted Returns
Mean
(t-statistic)
No. of obs.

-19.82%***
(-2.63)
324

-31.46%***
(-3.57)
195

-2.23%
(-0.17)
129

Debt Financing
Sample

Firm-Years with
Predicted Increase
in Leverage

Firm-Years with
Predicted Decrease
in Leverage

-29.23%**
(-1.831)

Difference

Panel A: One-Year Buy-and-Hold Adjusted Returns
Mean
(t-statistic)
No. of obs.

-6.70%***
(-3.53)
1,307

-5.55%**
(-2.52)
818

-8.63%**
(-2.47)
489

3.16%
(0.743)

Panel B: Three-Year Buy-and-Hold Adjusted Returns
Mean
(t-statistic)
No. of obs.

-2.24%
(-0.48)
1,307

-1.30%
(-0.22)
818

-8.15%
(-1.07)
489

6.85%
(0.712)

This table presents post-financing buy-and-hold size-, prior return-, and book-to-market-adjusted returns
for the external, equity, and debt financing sample. All of these samples are broken down to the sample
restricted to firm-years with predicted increase in leverage, and the sample restricted to firm-years with
predicted decrease in leverage. This table also presents the difference in adjusted returns between the
sample restricted to firm-years with predicted increase in leverage, and the sample restricted to firmyears with predicted decrease in leverage. Predicted change in leverage during a year is estimated using
the Baker and Wurgler (2002) model. The t-test is used to evaluate the statistical significance of means
and differences in means.
* * * , **, and * Significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively (based on tstatistics; one-tail tests for the difference, two-tail tests for other tests).
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Table 4.6. Post-financing BHAR (1984-1990)
External Financing
Sample

Firm-Years with
Predicted Increase
in Leverage

Firm-Years with
Predicted Decrease
in Leverage

Difference

Panel A: One-Year Buy-and-Hold Adjusted Returns
Mean
(f-statistic)
No. of obs.

-1.29%
(-0.85)
2,165

-0.90%
(-0.50)
1,448

-2.07%
(-0.75)
717

1.17%
(0.355)

Panel B: Three-Year Buy-and-Hold Adjusted Returns
Mean
(t-statistic)
No. of obs.

-4.13%
(-1.27)
2,165

-1.93%
(-0.55)
1,448

-8.55%
(-1.26)
717

6.62%
(0.868)
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Table 4.6 (Continued)
Equity Financing
Sample

Firm-Years with
Predicted Increase
in Leverage

Firm-Years with
Predicted Decrease
in Leverage

Difference

Panel A: One-Year Buy-and-Hold Adjusted Returns
Mean
(t-statistic)
No. of obs.

-0.19%
(-0.07)
478

-0.48%
(-0.14)
336

1.79%
(-0.30)
142

-2.27%
(-0.071)

Panel B: Three-Year Buy-and-Hold Adjusted Returns
Mean
(t-statistic)
No. of obs.

3.45%
(0.53)
478

-2.32%
(-0.30)
336

17.11%
(-1-47)
142

Debt Financing
Sample

Firm-Years with
Predicted Increase
in Leverage

Firm-Years with
Predicted Decrease
in Leverage

-19.43%
(-1.224)

Difference

Panel A: One-Year Buy-and-Hold Adjusted Returns
Mean
(t-statistic)
No. of obs.

-1.70%
(-0.97)
1,678

-1.02%
(-0.48)
1,112

-3.02%
(-0.97)
575

2.00%
(0.528)

Panel B: Three-Year Buy-and-Hold Adjusted Returns
Mean
(t-statistic)
No. of obs.

-6.27%*
(-1.68)
1,678

-1.82%
(-0.46)
1,112

-14.89%*
(-1.88)
575

13.07%*
(1.408)

This table presents post-financing buy-and-hold size-, prior return-, and book-to-market-adjusted returns
for the external, equity, and debt financing sample. All of these samples are broken down to the sample
restricted to firm-years with predicted increase in leverage, and the sample restricted to firm-years with
predicted decrease in leverage. This table also presents the difference in adjusted returns between the
sample restricted to firm-years with predicted increase in leverage, and the sample restricted to firmyears with predicted decrease in leverage. Predicted change in leverage during a year is estimated using
the Baker and Wurgler (2002) model. The t-test is used to evaluate the statistical significance of means
and differences in means.
* * * , **, and * Significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively (based on tstatistics; one-tail tests for the difference, two-tail tests for other tests).
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Table 4.7. Post-financing BHAR (1991-1997)
External Financing
Sample

Firm-Years with
Predicted Increase
in Leverage

Firm-Years with
Predicted Decrease
in Leverage

Difference

Panel A: One-Year Buy-and-Hold Adjusted Returns
Mean
(t-statistic)
No. of obs.

-6.31%***
(-4.16)
3,078

-6.49%***
(-3.50)
2,072

-5.93%**
(-2.25)
1,006

-0.56%
(-0.171)

Panel B: Three-Year Buy-and-Hold Adjusted Returns
Mean
(t-statistic)
No. of obs.

-16.30%***
(-3.69)
3,078

-17.48%***
(-3.23)
2,072

-13.89%*
(-1.82)
1,006

-3.59%
[-0.383)
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Table 4.7 (Continued)
Equity Financing
Sample

Firm-Years with
Predicted Increase
in Leverage

Firm-Years with
Predicted Decrease
in Leverage

Difference

Panel A: One-Year Buy-and-Hold Adjusted Returns
Mean
(t-statistic)
No. of obs.

-12.01%***
(-5.16)
1,386

-13.47%***
(-5.09)
988

-8.37%*
(-1-77)
398

-5.10%
(0.940)

Panel B: Three-Year Buy-and-Hold Adjusted Returns
Mean
(t-statistic)
No. of obs.

-24.14%***
(-3.51)
1,386

-23.77%***
(-2.97)
988

-25.05%*
(-1.86)
398

Debt Financing
Sample

Firm-Years with
Predicted Increase
in Leverage

Firm-Years with
Predicted Decrease
in Leverage

1.28%
(0.082)

Difference

Panel A: One-Year Buy-and-Hold Adjusted Returns
Mean
(t-statistic)
No. of obs.

-1.64%
(-0.83)
1,692

-0.12%
(-0.05)
1,084

-4.34%
(-1.41)
608

4.22%
(1.083)

Panel B: Three-Year Buy-and-Hold Adjusted Returns
Mean
(t-statistic)
No. of obs.

-9.88%*
(-1.72)
1,692

-11.74%
(-1.60)
1,084

-6.58%***
(-0.72)
608

-5.16%
(0.441)

This table presents post-financing buy-and-hold size-, prior return-, and book-to-market-adjusted returns
for the external, equity, and debt financing sample. All of these samples are broken down to the sample
restricted to firm-years with predicted increase in leverage, and the sample restricted to firm-years with
predicted decrease in leverage. This table also presents the difference in adjusted returns between the
sample restricted to firm-years with predicted increase in leverage, and the sample restricted to firmyears with predicted decrease in leverage. Predicted change in leverage during a year is estimated using
the Baker and Wurgler (2002) model. The t-test is used to evaluate the statistical significance of means
and differences in means.
* * * , **, and * Significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively (based on tstatistics; one-tail tests for the difference, two-tail tests for other tests).
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Table 4.8. Post-financing BHAR (1998-2004)
External Financing
Sample

Firm-Years with
Predicted Increase
in Leverage

Firm-Years with
Predicted Decrease
in Leverage

Difference

Panel A: One-Year Buy-and-Hold Adjusted Returns
Mean
(t-statistic)
No. of obs.

-6.82%***
(-2.86)
3,393

-3.93%
(-1.27)
2,278

-12.73%***
(-3.58)
1,115

8.80%**
(1.869)

Panel B: Three-Year Buy-and-Hold Adjusted Returns
Mean
(t-statistic)
No. of obs.

-15.58%***
(-5.62)
3,393

-14.35***
(-4.32)
2,278

-18.08%***
(-3.61)
1,115

3.73%
(0.621)
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Table 4.8 (Continued)
Equity Financing
Sample

Firm-Years with
Predicted Increase
in Leverage

Firm-Years with
Predicted Decrease
in Leverage

Difference

Panel A: One-Year Buy-and-Hold Adjusted Returns
Mean
(t-statistic)
No. of obs.

-4.00%
(-1.03)
1,734

0.62%
(0.13)
1,266

-16.50%***
(-2.69)
468

15.88%**
(2.042)

Panel B: Three-Year Buy-and-Hold Adjusted Returns
Mean
(t-statistic)
No. of obs.

-19 49***
(-5.07)
1,734

-15.52%***
(-3.50)
1,266

-30.20%***
(-3.94)
468

Debt Financing
Sample

Firm-Years with
Predicted Increase
in Leverage

Firm-Years with
Predicted Decrease
in Leverage

14.68%**
(1.657)

Difference

Panel A: One-Year Buy-and-Hold Adjusted Returns
Mean
(t-statistic)
No. of obs.

-9.77%***
(-3.60)
1,659

-9.62%***
(-2.72)
1,012

-10.01%**
(-2.36)
647

0.39%
(0.070)

Panel B: Three-Year Buy-and-Hold Adjusted Returns

Mean
(t-statistic)
No. of obs.

-11.49%***
(-2.88)
1,659

-12.88%**
(-2.57)
1,012

-9.31%
(-1.41)
647

-3.57%
(-0.431)

This table presents post-financing buy-and-hold size-, prior return-, and book-to-market-adjusted returns
for the external, equity, and debt financing sample. All of these samples are broken down to the sample
restricted to firm-years with predicted increase in leverage, and the sample restricted to firm-years with
predicted decrease in leverage. This table also presents the difference in adjusted returns between the
sample restricted to firm-years with predicted increase in leverage, and the sample restricted to firmyears with predicted decrease in leverage. Predicted change in leverage during a year is estimated using
the Baker and Wurgler (2002) model. The t-test is used to evaluate the statistical significance of means
and differences in means.
* * * , **, and * Significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively (based on tstatistics; one-tail tests for the difference, two-tail tests for other tests).

4.3 Evaluating Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns Using an
OLS Regression Model
Firms that have excessively high leverage are more likely to be managed by
optimistic managers. Di, Goodwin, and Marciukaityte (2009) utilize an excess leverage
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proxy to identify which firms are more likely to have optimistic managers. This is done
by calculating the excessive leverage of the firm before the external financing issue. In
order to calculate the excess leverage proxy, the model presented by Baker and Wurgler
(2002) is used to estimate predicted leverage changes.

This estimate is found by

modeling the annual changes in book leverage and is a continuous measure that shows
whether a firm is predicted to issue debt or equity before the external financing event.
The excess leverage proxy at the end of Year -1 is the absolute value but the opposite
sign of the predicted change in leverage during Year 0.
The findings in Table 3.2 suggest that firms that are predicted to increase
leverage have quite different characteristics than firms that are predicted to decrease
leverage. To assure that the difference in post-event performance between firms that
are predicted to increase leverage and firms that are predicted to decrease leverage are
not driven by the differences in firm characteristics, the firm-specific characteristics are
controlled in an OLS regression model. This is done with two different sets of control
variables to ensure that the results are robust.
The results from the first OLS regression analysis are shown in Table 4.9. The
dependent variables are one to three year post-financing buy-and-hold abnormal
returns using the size, prior return, and book-to-market matched sample. The control
variables include external financing level, logarithm of market-to-book ratio, and
logarithm of market value of equity. The variable excess leverage times the ratio of
equity financing to external financing is a cross product to test for different affects by
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debt versus equity. The dummy for equity financing indicates the performance of equity
versus debt.
The results from the second OLS regression analysis are shown in Table 4.10. As
in the first OLS regression, the dependent variables are one to three year post-financing
buy-and-hold abnormal returns using the size, prior return, and book-to-market
matched sample. The control variables, as suggested by Frank and Goyal (2007a),
include industry median leverage, market-to-book assets ratio, tangibility, profits, firm
size, and expected inflation. All of the control variables are estimated at the beginning
of Year 0.
Consistent with the buy-and-hold abnormal return analysis, both OLS regression
analyses support the Managerial Overoptimism Theory.

The results show that the

estimated coefficients for the excess leverage proxy variable are negative and significant
at the 10% or higher level for all three holding periods examined. This suggests that
controlling for firm characteristics does not change the finding that there is a negative
relationship between post-financing buy-and-hold abnormal returns and excess
leverage before financing. This suggests that matching by size, prior return, and bookto-market is sufficient to control for firm characteristics.
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Table 4.9. Post-financing stock performance
Variables

One-year

Two-years

Three-years

Intercept

-0.0604***
(9.88)

-0.0858***
(9.92)

-0.1154***
(12.24)

Excess Leverage

-0.0051**
(5.36)

-0.0047*
(2.29)

-0.0054*
(2.07)

0.0001
(0.42)

0.0006***
(6.96)

0.0005**
(4.59)

-0.0215
(2.47)

-0.0218
(1-26)

-0.0317
(1.83)

-0.0201**
(5.78)

-0.0339***
(8.15)

-0.0427***
(8.84)

-0.0629***
(31.96)

-0.0906***
(33.01)

-0.0893***
(21.87)

0.0067*
(3.04)

0.0091*
(2.79)

0.0010
(2.28)

Excess Leverage x
(Equity Financing/External Financing)
Dummy for Equity Financing Sample
External Financing
Log(Market-to-Book)
Log(Market Value of Equity)

This table presents OLS regressions examining the relation between post-financing stock performance and
predicted change in leverage. The dependent variables are one to three year post-financing buy-and-hold
abnormal returns using the size, prior return, and book-to-market matched sample. Buy-and-hold
abnormal return is the difference between the BHRs for the external financing firm and the matched firm.
The control variables include external financing level, logarithm of market-to-book ratio, and logarithm of
market value of equity. Excess leverage at the beginning of Year 0 has the same absolute value but the
opposite sign than the predicted change in leverage during Year 0. The variable excess leverage times the
ratio of equity financing to external financing is a cross product to test for different affects by debt versus
equity. External financing is the sum of equity and debt financing. Equity financing is the change in
common equity minus the change in retained earnings in Year 0. Debt financing is the change in total
debt in Year 0. External financing, equity financing, and debt financing are estimated during a fiscal year
and normalized by total assets at the beginning of that year. The dummy for equity financing is equal to 1
if in a year, a firm issues equity that is equal to or exceeds 10% of the firm's total assets and equal to 0
otherwise. The dummy for equity financing indicates the performance of equity versus debt. The marketto-book of equity and the market value of equity are estimated at the beginning of Year 0. Chi-square
statistics are reported in parentheses.
* * * , **, and * Significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively (based on the
chi-square statistics; one-tail test for excess leverage, two-tail tests for other variables).
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Table 4.10. Post-financing stock performance using Frank and Goyal (2007) control
variables
Variables

One-year

Two-years

Three-years

Intercept

-0.1224***
(20.02)

-0.1385***
(12.72)

-0.1429***
(9.18)

Excess Leverage

-0.0087***
(11.22)

-0.0081**
(4.82)

-0.0068*
(2.28)

0.0001
(0.39)

0.0006***
(6.91)

0.0005**
(4.21)

-0.0061
(0.68)

-0.0125
(0.41)

-0.0346
(2.10)

0.0770*
(3.27)

0.0582
(0.93)

-0.0505
(0.47)

0.0005*
(3.20)

0.0009**
(4.97)

0.0013**
(6.58)

-0.0122***
(32.98)

-0.0164***
(29.39)

-0.0172**
(21.89)

0.0018***
(21.12)

0.0022
(15.46)

0.0017**
(6.36)

0.0030
(0.58)

0.0021
(0.14)

0.0034
(0.25)

0.0001
(0.01)

-0.0014
(1.09)

-0.0020
(1.36)

Excess Leverage x
(Equity Financing/External Financing)
Dummy for Equity Financing Sample
Industry Median Leverage
Tangibility
Market-to-Book Asset Ratio
Profitability
Firm Size

Expected Inflation
This table presents OLS regressions examining the relation between post-financing stock performance and
predicted change in leverage. The dependent variables are one to three year post-financing buy-and-hold
abnormal returns using the size, prior return, and book-to-market matched sample. Buy-and-hold
abnormal return is the difference between the BHRs for the external financing firm and the matched firm.
Excess leverage at the beginning of Year 0 has the same absolute value but the opposite sign than the
predicted change in leverage during Year 0. The control variables, as suggested by Frank and Goyal
(2007a), include industry median leverage, market-to-book assets ratio, tangibility, profits, firm size, and
expected inflation. The industrial median leverage is the median total debt to market value of assets
determined by four digit SIC code and year. Market value of assets is the sum of price-close times shares
outstanding, debt in current liabilities, long-term debt, and preferred-liquidation value minus deferred
taxes and investment tax credit. Tangibility is the ratio of net property, plant, and equipment to total
assets. The market-to-book assets ratio is the ratio of the market value of assets to total assets.
Profitability is the ratio of operating income before depreciation to total assets. Firm size is the logarithm
of total assets. The expected inflation is the expected change in the consumer price index over the
coming year. All of the control variables are estimated at the beginning of Year 0. Chi-square statistics
are reported in parentheses.
* * * , **, and * Significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively (based on the
chi-square statistics; one-tail test for excess leverage, two-tail tests for other variables).
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4.3.1 Matching Robustness
To ensure that the difference in the firm characteristics between the external
financing issuing firm and the size, prior return, and book-to-market matched nonexternal finance issuing firm are not driving the results, the OLS regression analyses are
repeated using the non-issuing matched firms. The only change is that the dummy
variable for external financing is excluded since none of the matched firms issue
external financing. Tables 4.11 and 4.12 show the results of this robustness check. Both
of these analyses show a negative relationship between post-financing buy-and-hold
abnormal returns and excess leverage at the 10% or higher level for the one and two
year post-financing periods. The similarity in results between the OLS regression using
the firms issuing external financing and the OLS regression results using the non-issuing
matched firms suggests that the differences in firm characteristics are not driving the
results and that matching by size, prior return, and book-to-market is sufficient.
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Table 4.11. Post-financing stock performance using non-external finance issuing
matched firms
Variables

One-year

Two-years

Three-years

Intercept

•0.0546***
(8.73)

-0.0895***
(11.67)

-0.1178***
(13.75)

Excess Leverage

-0.0043**
(3.91)

-0.0045*
(2.10)

-0.0047
(1.60)

-0.0000
(1-51)

-0.0001***
(9.93)

-0.0001*
(3.59)

-0.2129***
(26.19)

-0.0268***
(20.64)

-0.3154***
(19.48)

Log(Market-to-Book)

0.0072
(0.38)

-0.0190
(1.31)

-0.0167
(0.69)

Log(Market Value of Equity)

-0.0029
(0.59)

-0.0008
(-1.02)

-0.0014
(0.05)

Excess Leverage x
(Equity Financing/External Financing)
External Financing

This table presents OLS regressions examining the relation between post-financing stock performance and
predicted change in leverage. The dependent variables are one to three year post-financing buy-and-hold
abnormal returns using the size, prior return, and book-to-market matched sample. Buy-and-hold
abnormal return is the difference between the BHRs for the external financing firm and the matched firm.
The control variables include external financing level, logarithm of market-to-book ratio, and logarithm of
market value of equity. Excess leverage at the beginning of Year 0 has the same absolute value but the
opposite sign than the predicted change in leverage during Year 0. The variable excess leverage times the
ratio of equity financing to external financing is a cross product to test for different affects by debt versus
equity. External financing is the sum of equity and debt financing. Equity financing is the change in
common equity minus the change in retained earnings in Year 0. Debt financing is the change in total
debt in Year 0. External financing, equity financing, and debt financing are estimated during a fiscal year
and normalized by total assets at the beginning of that year. The market-to-book of equity and the
market value of equity are estimated at the beginning of Year 0. Chi-square statistics are reported in
parentheses.
* * * , **, and * Significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively (based on the
chi-square statistics; one-tail test for excess leverage, two-tail tests for other variables).
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Table 4.12. Post-financing stock performance using non-external finance issuing
matched firms and Frank and Goyal (2007) control variables
Variables

One-year

Two-years

Three-years

Intercept

-0.1264
(24.15)

-0.1153***
(11.27)

-0.1212***
(8.48)

-0.0087***
(11.11)

-0.0044*
(2.06)

-0.0042
(1.29)

0.0001
(0.40)

-0.0001***
(10.14)

-0.0001*
(3.77)

Industry Median Leverage

0.0806*
(3.72)

0.0924
(2.70)

0.0944
(1.92)

Tangibility

0.0005*
(3.32)

0.0010**
(5.30)

0.0006
(1-26)

Market-to-Book Asset Ratio

-0.0124***
(35.17)

0.0057
(1-75)

0.0041
(0.60)

Profitability

0.0019***
(22.03)

-0.0051***
(59.82)

-0.0061***
(59.32)

Firm Size

0.0032
(0.64)

-0.0003
(0.00)

-0.0010
(0.03)

Expected Inflation

0.0001
(0.02)

0.0025*
(3.22)

0.0020
(1.50)

Excess Leverage
Excess Leverage x
(Equity Financing/External Financing)

This table presents OLS regressions examining the relation between post-financing stock performance and
predicted change in leverage. The dependent variables are one to three year post-financing buy-and-hold
abnormal returns using the size, prior return, and book-to-market matched sample. Buy-and-hold
abnormal return is the difference between the BHRs for the external financing firm and the matched firm.
Excess leverage at the beginning of Year 0 has the same absolute value but the opposite sign than the
predicted change in leverage during Year 0. The control variables, as suggested by Frank and Goyal
(2007a), include industry median leverage, market-to-book assets ratio, tangibility, profits, firm size, and
expected inflation. The industrial median leverage is the median total debt to market value of assets
determined by four digit SIC code and year. Market value of assets is the sum of price-close times shares
outstanding, debt in current liabilities, long-term debt, and preferred-liquidation value minus deferred
taxes and investment tax credit. Tangibility is the ratio of net property, plant, and equipment to total
assets. The market-to-book assets ratio is the ratio of the market value of assets to total assets.
Profitability is the ratio of operating income before depreciation to total assets. Firm size is the logarithm
of total assets. The expected inflation is the expected change in the consumer price index over the
coming year. All of the control variables are estimated at the beginning of Year 0. Chi-square statistics
are reported in parentheses.
* * * , **, and * Significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively (based on the
chi-square statistics; one-tail test for excess leverage, two-tail tests for other variables)
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4.3.2 Size Robustness
To ensure that a subsection of the sample is not driving the results, small and
large firms in the sample are analyzed for relationships between post-financing stock
performance and excess leverage for one year post-financing buy-and-hold abnormal
returns (Table 4.13). Small and large firms are defined in relation to the mean of the
market value of equity. Small firms are the smallest 25% of the firms and the large firms
are the largest 25% of the firms. This analysis is done using both sets of firm-specific
characteristics introduced in section 4.3. Similar to when the full sample is used, the
results show that the estimated coefficients for the excess leverage variable are
negative and significant at the 5% or higher level. This implies that the analysis applies
to all sizes of firms.
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Table 4.13. Post-financing stock returns for small and large firms
One-Year Post-Financing BHARs

One-Year Post-Fiinancing BHARs

Variables

Small Firms

Large Firms

Small Firms

Large Firms

Intercept

-0.0609**
(4.25)

-0.1176
(0.76)

-0.1249
(9.70)

-0.2756**
(4.51)

Excess Leverage

-0.0050**
(3.58)

-0.0125***
(5.45)

-0.0103***
(11.04)

-0.0164***
(5.53)

Excess Leverage *
(Equity Financing/External
Financing)

0.0002
(0.92)

-0.0002
(0.03)

0.0002
(0.93)

-0.0002
(0.02)

Dummy for Equity Financing
Sample

-0.0234
(2.18)

0.0257
(0.43)

-0.0066
(0.17)

0.0266
(0.44)

External Financing

-0.0228*
(3.59)

-0.0111
(1.04)

-0.0477***
(10.94)

-0.0689***
(7.91)

0.0061
(0.73)

0.0125
(0.63)

Industry Median Leverage

0.0651
(1.71)

0.0201
(0.03)

Tangibility

0.0006
(2.75)

-0.0001
(0.02)

Market-to-Book Asset Ratio

-0.0138***
(8.34)

-0.0030
(0.60)

Profitability

0.0013***
(7.49)

0.0068***
(29.14)

Firm Size

0.0043
(0.35)

0.0160
(1.23)

Expected Inflation

0.0009
(0.61)

-0.0041
(1.81)

Log(Market-to-Book)
Log(Market Value of Equity)

This table details OLS regressions examining the relation between post-financing stock performance and
predicted change in leverage. Buy-and-hold returns are adjusted using the size, prior return, and book-tomarket matched sample. Small and large firms are defined in relation to the mean of the market value of
equity. Small firms are the smallest 25% of the firms and the large firms are the largest 25% of the firms.
Chi-square statistics are reported in parentheses.
* * * , **, and * Significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively (based on the
chi-square statistics; one-tail test for excess leverage, two-tail tests for other variables).
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4.4 Alternative Measures of Managerial Overoptimism
Since managerial overoptimism is difficult to measure and many other factors
can affect leverage levels, an alternate measure of managerial overoptimism is
accessed. The alternate measure is a press proxy for overoptimism. The methodology
to estimate this variable was developed by Malmendier and Tate (2008). This measure
uses press coverage in leading business publications to see which CEOs outsiders
perceive as confident or cautious. The press proxy for overoptimism is used to check
the validity of the results found with the excess leverage proxy by seeing how the two
variables relate.
The excess leverage proxy is compared to the press proxy for managerial
overoptimism in Table 4.14. The correlation is calculated between each of the proxies
as well as indicator variables for each of the proxies. The indicator for excess leverage
proxy is equal to 1 when excess leverage is greater than 0, and is equal to 0 otherwise.
The press proxy for overoptimism is a measure of the confidence of the CEO in the year
after the external financing. This variable is defined as the difference between the
number of articles that mention such words as "confident" and "optimistic" and the
number of articles that mention such words as "reliable" and "cautious" divided by the
number of articles in both groups for a particular year. The indicator for the press proxy
for overoptimism is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 when the number of articles
that mention such words as "confident" and "optimistic" is greater than the number of
articles that mention such words as "reliable" and "cautious" and 0 otherwise.
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Table 4.14 shows that the indicator variable for press proxy is positively
correlated with both the excess leverage proxy and the indicator variable for excess
leverage proxy. The statistically strongest correlation is between the indicator for the
press proxy and the indicator for the excess leverage proxy (p-value = 0.0092). These
findings suggest a relationship between the excess leverage proxy and the press proxy
for overoptimism and support the validity of the excess leverage proxy as a measure of
managerial overoptimism.

Table 4.14. Correlations between leverage and press proxies for managerial optimism

Excess Leverage Proxy

Indicator for the
Excess Leverage
Proxy

Press Proxy for Overoptimism

Correlation
P-value
No. of obs.

0.01265
0.4568
86

0.00357
0.4870
86

Indicator for the Press Proxy for
Overoptimism

Correlation
P-value
No. of obs.

0.07235
0.0775*
427

0.11414
0.0092***
427

This table reports the correlation coefficients between the excess leverage proxy and the press proxy for
managerial optimism. The excess leverage proxy (Di, Goodwin, and Marciukaityte 2009, 26) at the
beginning of Year 0 has the same absolute value but the opposite sign of the predicted change in leverage
during Year 0. Predicted change in leverage is estimated using Baker and Wurgler (2002) model. The
indicator for excess leverage proxy is equal to 1 when excess leverage is greater than 0, otherwise the
indicator for the excess leverage proxy is equal to 0. The press proxy for overoptimism is a measure of the
confidence of the CEO in the year after the external financing. This variable is defined as the difference
between the number of articles that mention such words as "confident" and "optimistic" and the number
of articles that mention such words as "reliable" and "practical" divided by the number of articles in both
groups for a particular year. The indicator for the press proxy for overoptimism is a dummy variable that
is equal to 1 when the number of articles that mention such words as "confident" and "optimistic" is
greater than the number of articles that mention such words as "reliable" and "practical" and 0
otherwise.
* * * , **, and * Indicates statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels (based on the t statistics; onetail tests).
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4.5 Summary
This chapter presents the results of the empirical analyses to determine what
motivates managers when they are making external equity and debt decisions. The goal
is to investigate whether the motivation for the decisions about capital structure are
driven by market timing or managerial overoptimism. The debt and equity decisions of
a firm are investigated based on if the decision brings the firm closer to or further away
from their optimal capital structure. The main findings of this study are as follows:
1. In the first post-financing year firms that issue equity when they are predicted
to issue debt significantly out-perform firms that issue equity when they are predicted
to issue equity. In addition, firms that issue debt when they are predicted to issue
equity perform significantly worse than firms that issue debt and are predicted to issue
debt. These findings hold when firms are matched based on size, prior return, and
book-to-market as well as industry, market value of equity, and book-to-market. The
one-year post financing results hold for firms issuing debt across the entire study period
but only hold for firms that issue equity in the 1970-1976 and 1998-2004 time periods.
2. The difference in return for firms that are predicted to increase leverage is
significantly different than the firms that are predicted to decrease leverage even when
controlling for market, size, book-to-market, and momentum factors. The difference in
performance is statistically significant at the 1% level for at least three post-financing
years.
3. The excess leverage proxy is negatively and significantly related to the one,
two, and three year post-financing buy-and-hold abnormal returns even when firm
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characteristics are controlled. This also holds when non-issuing matched firms, small
firms, and large firms are analyzed. This suggests that matching by size, prior return,
and book-to-market is sufficient to control for firm characteristics.
4. The excess leverage proxy is significantly correlated with the press proxy.
These findings suggest a relationship between the excess leverage proxy and the press
proxy for overoptimism and support the validity of the excess leverage proxy as a
measure of managerial overoptimism.
Overall, the results are opposite to the predictions of market timing and
consistent with the Managerial Overoptimism Theory. This suggests that managers are
influenced by optimism when they are making debt and equity financing decisions.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS

5.1 Summary of Prior Research
Management of capital structure is an important part of maximizing the firm
value.

Financial research has proposed many theories that explain aspects of firm

behavior when a firm makes financial decisions that change the firm's capital structure.
However, none of the theories fully explain why firms with similar fundamental
characteristics make different financing choices.
The Tradeoff Theory and the Pecking Order Theory have been around the
longest, have been studied the most, and have the most advocates. These two theories
have been studied separately and together but still fail to explain all firm behavior. The
evidence found against the Tradeoff Theory and the Pecking Order Theory has led to
several other capital structure theories being proposed, including the Market Timing
Theory and Managerial Overoptimism Theory.
The Market Timing Theory suggests that firms issue stock when the market is
overvaluing a firm and repurchase equity when the firm is undervalued.

Empirical

evidence shows that firms issue equity when stock price has gone up. In addition,
evidence shows that firms underperform for three to five years following IPO, SEO, and
private equity issues. The evidence on the persistence of the Market Timing Theory is
90
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mixed.

Some studies show that market timing has a long term affect on capital

structure while others show that there is no affect or it is reversed in just a few years. In
addition, this theory does not explain the underperformance of firms after debt issue.
The Managerial Overoptimism Theory suggests that overoptimistic managers
prefer to issue debt rather than equity due to their belief that the firm's stock price is
too low based on their insider knowledge of the firm's ability to generate positive net
present value projects.

Empirical evidence shows that manager confidence is a

significant predictor of leverage level and that overoptimistic managers rely on internal
financing first and issue more debt than equity when external financing is necessary. In
addition, evidence shows that high growth firms that issue debt underperform those
that issue equity.

5.2 Summary of Current Findings and Conclusions
This study focuses on what motivates managers when they are making external
financing decisions.

It investigated whether the motivation for the decisions about

capital structure are driven by market timing or managerial overoptimism. When firms
are making external financing decisions there are four scenarios that could occur: a firm
that is expected to issue debt does issue debt, a firm that is expected to issue debt
issues equity, a firm that is expected to issue equity issues debt, and a firm that is
expected to issue equity does issue equity.
In order to determine whether firms are moving closer to or farther away from
their optimal capital structure when they issue external financing, this study uses the
model presented in Baker and Wurgler (2002). This model estimates the predicted
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change in book leverage which is a continuous measure that shows whether a firm is
predicted to issue debt or equity before the external financing event. As suggested by
Di, Goodwin, and Marciukaityte (2009), the absolute value but opposite sign of this
measure is used as an excess leverage proxy. This study finds that the excess leverage
proxy is negatively and significantly related to the one, two, and three year postfinancing buy-and-hold abnormal returns even when firm characteristics are controlled.
This also holds when non-issuing matched firms, small firms, and large firms are
analyzed. This suggests that the firm matching methodology, which used size, prior
return, and book-to-market to match, is sufficient to control for firm characteristics.
This result is consistent with the Managerial Overoptimism Theory.
The results of this study show that in the first post-financing year firms that issue
equity when they are predicted to issue debt significantly out-perform firms that issue
equity when they are predicted to issue equity. In addition, firms that issue debt when
they are predicted to issue equity perform significantly worse than firms that issue debt
and are predicted to issue debt. These results support the Managerial Overoptimism
Theory. These results hold when firms are matched based on size, prior return, and
book-to-market as well as when they are matched based on industry, market value of
equity, and book-to-market. The one-year post financing results also hold for firms
issuing debt across the entire study period but only hold for firms that issue equity in
the 1970-1976 and 1998-2004 time periods.
addressed in future analysis.

This discrepancy in results can be

93
This study also shows that the difference in return for firms that are predicted to
increase leverage is significantly different than the firms that are predicted to decrease
leverage even when controlling for market, size, book-to-market, and momentum
factors. The difference in performance is statistically significant at the 1% level for at
least three years after external financing is issued.
This study examines press releases mentioning manager optimism or caution
(Malmendier and Tate 2008, 24) as a proxy for managerial overoptimism. The results
show that the excess leverage proxy and the press proxy for managerial overoptimism
are related with a positive correlation. These findings suggest a relationship between
the excess leverage proxy and the press proxy for overoptimism and support the validity
of the excess leverage proxy as a measure of managerial overoptimism.
This study evaluates what influences manager when they are making decisions
about issuing external financing.

This question is analyzed using many different

evaluation criteria. Overall, the results are opposite to the predictions of the Market
Timing Theory and consistent with the Managerial Overoptimism Theory. This suggests
that manager's optimism influences their decisions related to external financing.
If firms are going to influence managers to improve their decisions, there has to
be an understanding of what drives manager decisions which are not in the best interest
of shareholders. When managerial overoptimism instead of agency problems are the
source of suboptimal manager decisions, then designing better compensation contracts
that bring the manager and shareholder goals in enhanced alignment will not help. This
is because overoptimistic managers believe that they are acting in the best interest of
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the shareholder. Russo and Schoemaker (1992) show that two elements essential to
addressing overconfidence is feedback and accountability.

Therefore, more active

feedback from the board of directors and more accountability on the use of internal
funds are ways to manage the decisions of overoptimistic managers.

5.3 Future Research
Additional work in bringing more insight into manager overoptimism and
investor overoptimism would be beneficial to enhance this study. A survey of investors
similar to Tourani-Rad and Kirkby (2005) would allow for the controlling of some of the
variation caused by investor overoptimism.

Incorporating manager's background

information into the analysis of the relationship between post-financing stock
performance and excess leverage would bring more insight into influence of the
manager's background on capital structure decisions. Malmendier and Tate (2005) and
Frank and Goyal (2007b) CEO characteristics could be used to complete this analysis. An
alternate measure of the excess leverage, such as the leverage factor developed by
George and Hwang (2007), could further show the robustness of the excess leverage
proxy as a predictor of managerial overoptimism. George and Hwang's (2007) leverage
factor is the difference between returns to low and high leverage firms. In addition, an
alternate measure of managerial overoptimism, such as the managerial optimism proxy
developed by Barros and Silveira (2007), could also show the robustness of the results of
this study.

Barros and Silveira (2007) developed a series of proxies of managerial

overoptimism that are based on the manager's status as an entrepreneur.
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